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Abstract 
The global energy system currently faces a number of significant challenges which have 
the potential to undermine long-term sustainable development, including the need to 
maintain secure access to affordable energy supplies and mitigate climate change. This 
report explores the role of energy technology investment policies, including R&D and 
demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs in overcoming these challenges. The 
analysis considers the mechanisms by which energy technology policy initiatives may 
affect technology characteristics and deployment, and how technology deployment 
influences overall features of the energy system, and thereby energy security and 
climate change. The results identify potential targets for technology policy support, 
including the need to co-ordinate complementary technology strategies. Moreover, we 
discuss some critical insights related to the impact of the broader policy environment on 
successful technology deployment, and the potential for certain technology policies to 
result in undesirable technology lock-out. 
This research was carried out under the SAPIENTIA project1, sponsored by the 
European Commission (DG Research), which sought to develop methodologies to 
support decision makers concerned with the energy-environment-policy nexus in 
formulating technology policy. Importantly, the results presented here represent only 
part of the output of the integrated SAPIENTIA project, and are highly dependent on 
the characteristics of our modeling tools. Nonetheless, this analysis provides some 
instructive insights for the development of more comprehensive methodologies for the 
assessment of impacts of energy technology support policies. 
 
                                               
1
 SAPIENTIA stands for Systems Analysis for Progress and Innovation in Energy Technologies for 
Integrated Assessment. 
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Measuring the Impact of Energy Technology Investment on 
Long-term Sustainability 
Hal Turton 
1 Introduction 
Energy technology investment policies, including research and development (R&D) and 
demonstration, procurement and deployment programs, are important driving forces in 
the development of energy systems. Understanding the mechanisms by which 
technology policies generally, and R&D specifically contribute to long-term energy 
technology choice, and improvements in the overall energy system, are important for 
designing strategic policy responses aimed at achieving the goals of sustainable 
development (Nakićenović 1997). Ideally, an improved and quantitative understanding 
of the potential impact of technology investment on sustainability could provide policy 
and decision makers with the insights necessary to formulate the most effective energy-
related R&D and complementary strategies. 
Realising sustainable energy systems within the context of overall sustainable 
development requires overcoming a number of challenges in terms of delivering 
affordable, secure and clean energy for poverty alleviation and ongoing development 
throughout the world. Among other threats to sustainable energy development 
confronting policy makers, some of the most significant relate to climate change, air 
pollution, security of energy supply and economic development. Two of these 
challenges – mitigating the impacts of climate change and maintaining security of 
energy supply – are prominent issues on both national and international policy-making 
agendas. The increasing evidence of human-induced interference with the earth’s 
climate system and mounting concern about potentially serious future adverse impacts 
make global climate change one of the most significant challenges to the realisation of 
sustainable development in the long term (IPCC, 2001a). Efforts to address climate 
change necessarily require a focus on the global energy system, which is the major 
source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Accordingly, climate policy calls 
for, among others, the investigation of low-emissions alternatives for energy production, 
conversion and final use, including the role of technology support programs (e.g., IPCC 
2001b; Hoffert et al. 2002; Hasselmann et al, 2003). 
Security of energy supply is considered a more pressing short-term concern by policy 
makers. An excessive reliance on fossil fuels, oil and natural gas in particular, is an 
issue of concern because it potentially creates economic, physical and geopolitical risks 
(EC 2001). Specifically, the current overall dependence of OECD countries on oil 
supply from politically volatile regions and the definition of appropriate responses to 
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potential supply disruptions remain challenging issues (e.g., DOC 1999; EC 2001; IEA 
2001). 
Climate change and security-of-supply are complex issues, and overcoming the 
challenges to sustainability posed by either will in all likelihood require the application 
of a broad portfolio of policy instruments and support (see Turton and Barreto 2005). 
This analysis seeks to assess the potential role of two instruments that exploit 
technological change, which is not only a key driving force behind the anthropogenic 
contribution to climate change and resource depletion, but may also be an important 
instrument for mitigating the impact of, and adapting to climate change and energy 
supply constraints (IPCC, 2001b; Nakićenović, 2003; Turton and Barreto 2005).  
The specific policy instruments examined in this study include: energy-related research 
and development (R&D) investment and energy-related demonstration and deployment 
(hereon referred to as D&D) programs. Both of these policy instruments are examined 
using the notion of “shocks”, i.e., one-off incremental investments in either research and 
development, or demonstration and deployment (see Turton and Barreto (2003) for a 
discussion). For each of these policy instruments, we examine the resulting incremental 
change in a number of sustainability indicators related to climate change and security of 
supply when the policy instrument is applied, relative to the costs of application of the 
instrument (measured in €1999s throughout this report). Hereafter, this ratio is referred 
to as the “impact” of the policy instrument. 
The specific climate change indicators considered here comprise: atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 and CH4, global temperature change and global sea-level rise. In 
this analysis, these indicators are generally reported for the year 2100 because the 
inertia in both energy and climate systems means that policy impacts take a long time to 
fully emerge. The indicators for security of energy supply are long-term global 
resources-to-production (denoted here as R:P) ratios for oil and natural gas, both of 
them reported for the year 2060. We discuss the selection of this year in the sections 
below, but generally, the first decade of the second half of the 21st century may be a 
time when resources of oil and gas are under significant pressure, but before which the 
energy system has relatively few opportunities to shift to other energy sources. 
This research was carried out under the SAPIENTIA project2, sponsored by the 
European Commission (DG Research), which sought to examine the effectiveness of 
energy-technology R&D and D&D programs in stimulating the adoption of new 
technologies, and the consequent impact on a number of sustainability indicators. 
Accordingly, this analysis builds on earlier work for the SAPIENTIA project involving 
development and extension of the energy-systems model ERIS (Energy Research and 
Investment Strategies) (Turton and Barreto 2003). This development and extension 
successfully sought to introduce key mechanisms of technological change in energy 
systems into ERIS, and compute the sustainability indicators of interest, applying the 
MAGICC climate model (Wigley and Raper 1997; Wigley 2003). Furthermore, relevant 
key energy technology candidates for R&D and D&D support were also incorporated. 
More detail on the model extensions is discussed in Turton and Barreto (2003). 
                                               
2
 SAPIENTIA stands for Systems Analysis for Progress and Innovation in Energy Technologies for 
Integrated Assessment. 
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The remainder of this document is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the 
model extensions for the SAPIENTIA project, in particular those made subsequent to 
the publication of the mid-term project report (see Turton and Barreto 2003). Section 3 
then describes the baseline scenario, which sets the context in which the technology 
support policies explored in subsequent sections are applied. The main analysis begins 
in Section 4, which describes the effect of optimistic and pessimistic future scenarios of 
R&D support. Section 5 then presents an assessment of the impact of R&D and 
demonstration and deployment (D&D) shocks on the indicators of sustainable 
development. Section 5 also examines the effects of a combination of R&D and D&D 
shocks. Finally, we summarise and present some conclusions in Section 6.  
2 Additional extensions to the ERIS model  
The analysis for the SAPIENTIA project was performed using the modeling framework 
developed at IIASA-ECS and described in Turton and Barreto (2003). This framework 
comprises the energy systems model ERIS and the MAGICC climate model (Wigley 
and Raper 1997; Wigley 2003). ERIS3 is a multi-regional “bottom-up” energy-systems 
optimization model that endogenises learning curves. The original version of the model 
was developed as a joint effort between ECS/IIASA and the Paul Scherrer Institute 
(PSI) in Switzerland during the EC-sponsored TEEM and SAPIENT projects, where it 
was mainly used to examine issues related to the endogenization of mechanisms of 
technological change (Messner, 1998; Kypreos et al., 2000; Barreto and Kypreos, 2000, 
2004).  
At the end of 2003, the ERIS model was substantially expanded and recalibrated at 
ECS/IIASA in order to address the objectives of the SAPIENTIA project, in particular 
those related to climate change and transportation indicators. For this purpose, the 
model was restructured and a number of features added. The main modifications 
described in the mid-term report (Turton and Barreto 2003), include: 
• development of cluster approach to technological learning; 
• disaggregation and additional technological detail in the non-electric sector, 
particularly transportation; 
• addition of an energy carrier production sector, specifically for hydrogen, 
alcohol and Fischer-Tropsch liquids production; 
• incorporation of methane and nitrous oxide emissions and abatement cost curves 
for these gases; 
• inclusion of sulfur dioxide emissions; and 
• inclusion of geological and terrestrial carbon storage. 
In many cases, these modifications to the ERIS model were made on the basis of output 
from other work packages in the SAPIENTIA project, or the anticipated output in cases 
where prerequisite work packages were incomplete at the time the mid-term report was 
prepared. Accordingly, where necessary, the model has been updated and refined 
subsequent to the mid-term report as prerequisite work packages were completed. For 
instance, Sections 2.2.3 and 3 in the mid-term report (Turton and Barreto 2003) 
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discussed preliminary approaches to the modeling of two-factor learning and clustering 
technological learning. Although the main elements of the approaches described in the 
mid-term report have been maintained, the actual formulation of learning in the ERIS 
model has been updated to incorporate the two-factor learning and cluster specification 
of Kouvaritakis and Panos (2005). The modeling of learning is discussed in Section 2.1 
below. 
Furthermore, the alternative technology specification has required updating of the 
assumed fossil fuel resources presented in Section 2.1.2 of the mid-term report. The 
ERIS model now includes around half the unconventional oil resources estimated by 
Rogner (1997) and referred to as Category VI resources in Table 1 in the mid-term 
report. These unconventional oil resource were not included in the interim version of 
ERIS described in the mid-term report, but this revision reflects a less pessimistic 
assessment of future availability of oil resources consistent with other features of the 
overall scenario used in this analysis (see Turton and Barreto 2003). Importantly, we 
continue to exclude highly speculative “additional occurrences” of oil and gas 
resources. 
2.1 Learning and 2FLCs 
Technology learning can be represented in energy system models such as ERIS by 
incorporating non-linear one or two-factor learning curves (1FLCs, 2FLCs) that 
represent the impact on technology characteristics of increasing experience or R&D. 
However, the complexity of the ERIS energy systems model renders it unsuitable for 
solution with non-linear programming (NLP) methods. With complex non-convex 
models, NLP solvers are unlikely to find the global optimum, and may experience 
extremely long run times. Accordingly, in the past, a mixed-integer programming (MIP) 
formulation of ERIS was used to approximate non-linear learning curves using a piece-
wise step function (see Barreto and Kypreos 2000).  
However, for the SAPIENTIA project it is necessary to apply two-factor learning curves 
(2FLCs) to account for the impact of different future research and development (R&D) 
budget allocations. A sophisticated learning formulation, that incorporates learning-by-
doing, learning-by-searching, technology clusters and other features, has been proposed 
for the project (Kouvaritakis and Panos 2005). Many of the features of this learning 
formulation can be incorporated relatively easily into an MIP model formulation, 
including most of the non-linearities. However, the large number of learning 
technologies, and the errors likely to be introduced by attempting to eliminate all of the 
non-linearities raise some further challenges. Because it is not realistic to apply a NLP 
formulation of the ERIS model, and considering both the number of technology 
investment ‘shocks’ that need to be applied in the SAPIENTIA project and the 
uncertainty of obtaining optimal solutions, another alternative was chosen that 
preserved the detailed learning relationships proposed by Kouvaritakis and Panos 
(2005).  
Accordingly, we apply an iterative linear and MIP formulation. This involves iterating 
between the linear programming (LP) formulation of the model and an exogenous 
learning sub-module which incorporates the non-linear 2FLC formulations proposed by 
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Kouvaritakis and Panos (2005). Cumulative installations from the LP model form the 
input to the learning sub-module, which calculates new specific costs that are fed back 
to the LP model. The LP model is rerun with these new specific costs to determine new 
cumulative capacities, which are then processed by the learning module. The process is 
repeated until there is sufficient convergence. The specific costs at convergence are then 
applied to an MIP model that accounts for the non-linearities associated with 
transmission and distribution infrastructure development (see Turton and Barreto 2003). 
The main drawback of this approach is that it eliminates foresight regarding the impact 
of learning on future technology costs. That is, within each iteration technology cost and 
performance is independent of experience, although experience does affect technology 
characteristics in subsequent iterations. However, this loss of foresight regarding the 
effect of technology experience and R&D may in fact better reflect the uncertainty 
faced by decision makers when selecting the most suitable technologies (for deployment 
or R&D). Moreover, from a technical standpoint, experiments with this formulation 
produce results almost identical to the equivalent MIP model, but in approximately 20-
35 percent of the time. Accordingly, it is assumed that any errors introduced by 
implementing learning in this way are smaller than those associated with the alternative 
of linearising and estimating complex non-linear learning equations. This approach is 
not only well suited for incorporating the more sophisticated learning formulation that 
has been proposed for SAPIENTIA, but facilitates more extensive examination of 
investment policy shocks. 
3 Baseline scenario 
One critical factor affecting long-term sustainability, including climate change 
mitigation and maintaining security of energy supply, and also expected to affect the 
impact of policies aimed at achieving sustainable development, is the likely trajectory of 
energy-system development without additional technology policies. The extent to which 
the baseline scenario of the evolution of the energy system is fossil fuel intensive, or 
reliant on new technologies, has a large bearing on the potential impact of additional 
technology policies on indicators of sustainable development. Importantly, however, it 
is not necessarily a simple linear relationship. For example, additional public or private 
support for key low-emissions technologies may have little impact when the future is 
dominated by either incumbent technologies, which enjoy enormous competitive 
advantages, or low-emissions technologies that become successful regardless. Instead, it 
is in those cases where technology choice is finely balanced, or where the timing of 
market penetration is critical to the long-term success of a technology, that technology 
support can be most effective in realising sustainable development. The baseline 
scenario can provide some indication of where potential targets for technology policy 
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3.1 Policy baseline 
3.1.1 Climate policy 
In constructing the baseline scenario we do not make the unrealistic assumption that no 
efforts are made over the next 100 years to mitigate the risks of climate change. Rather, 
we assume that all world regions implement greenhouse gas abatement policies and 
measures at some point during the 21st century, although at different times and rates 
depending on regional circumstances. Moreover, these abatement policies are assumed 
to be independent of the potential technology policies explored in the SAPIENTIA 
project. The climate change mitigation policies and measures are represented in a 
stylised way in the baseline scenario in the form of taxes on greenhouse gas emissions. 
In reality, world regions are likely to adopt an array of abatement measures, and the use 
of a GHG tax in the baseline scenario merely seeks to represent the effective stringency 
of all of these measures. The GHG tax rates assumed in this scenario and applied to the 
six main gases are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: GHG tax rates (€/tonne carbon equivalent) assumed under the baseline scenario 
 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Europe 0.00 14.00 21.00 33.30 50.50 70.70 98.60 98.60 98.60 98.60 98.60 
Rest of OECD 0.00 7.60 12.60 22.80 37.90 56.90 83.80 83.80 83.80 83.80 83.80 
Rest of World 0.00 1.40 3.60 9.20 19.40 34.30 62.20 62.20 62.20 62.20 62.20 
Note: all figures are in €99. 
Source: SAPIENTIA Delphi analysis. 
3.1.2 R&D policy – public and private 
Another critical feature of this scenario is the assumed future energy R&D investment 
budget and distribution across the portfolio of competing energy technologies. The 
R&D investment outlook, including the allocation to different technologies is described 
in ICCS-NTUA (2005), and this is used to develop the baseline described below. 
Importantly, future R&D budgets and expenditure patterns are highly uncertain, and as 
part of this analysis we explore this uncertainty by also examining extremely optimistic 
and pessimistic scenarios of future R&D. The results of this sensitivity analysis are 
presented in Section 4.  
Firstly, however, we examine a number of salient characteristics of the baseline 
scenario. 
3.2 Detailed description of baseline scenario results 
3.2.1 Technology uptake and adoption 
In the context of examining the potential for different technologies to contribute to 
sustainable development, it is useful to examine technology choice in the main energy 
sectors under this baseline scenario. Accordingly, we show in Figure 1 the uptake of 
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different electricity generation technologies under the baseline scenario over the 21st 
century.  
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
G
en
er
at
io
n
 
(G
W
y)
HEF
ORE
WND
SPV
STC
STH
HYD
BIP
NNU
NUC
GFC
GTR
GSC
GCC
OLC
HCA
HCC
 
Figure 1: Global electricity generation mix, baseline scenario (with GHG abatement 
policy).  
Note: Technology abbreviations are as follows: HCC: conventional coal, HCA: advanced coal (IGCC), 
OLC: oil conventional, GCC: gas combined-cycle, GSC: gas steam cycle, GTR: gas turbine, GFC: gas 
fuel cell, NUC: nuclear conventional, NNU: new nuclear, BIP: biomass gasification, HYD: hydro, STH: 
solar thermal, STC: solar thermal cogeneration, SPV: solar photovoltaics, WND: wind turbine, ORE: 
other renewables, HEF: hydrogen fuel cell. 
The most noticeable transition across the century is the declining share of fossil fuels in 
electricity generation, particularly from coal, which is not surprising when one 
considers the imposition of GHG taxes assumed in this scenario. However, in absolute 
terms generation from both coal and natural gas increases until mid-way through the 
second half of the century, and generation from IGCC coal and gas fuel cell generators 
is still increasing in 2100. The decline in aggregate generation from fossil fuels 
coincides with an increase in generation from nuclear (both 3rd and 4th generation) and 
renewable sources of energy. A diverse mix of renewable generators is supported by 
resource constraints and niche markets, with no clearly dominant technology, although 
solar photovoltaics appear to be restricted to very small niche markets. Along with 4th 
generation nuclear power plants, hydrogen-fuelled stationary fuel cells are among the 
fastest growing sources of generation at the end of the century. Accordingly, if we look 
across the whole century, the dominant sources of global generation shift from: 
conventional coal, nuclear and hydroelectric generation in 2000, to; gas combined cycle, 
conventional coal and nuclear in 2050, and finally to; conventional and advanced 
nuclear, and hydrogen fuel cell generation in 2100.  
The continuing dominance of fossil fuels mid-way through the 21st century, even under 
a baseline scenario that includes climate change mitigation policies, illustrates the 
inertia of energy systems, particularly the time taken for new technologies to become 
competitive and penetrate the market on a large scale. 
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Although an increasingly important part of the global energy system under this scenario, 
electricity generation is only one of a number of energy sub-sectors in which 
technological change may substantially transform production. In Figure 2 we present the 
development of the subsector representing other forms of secondary fuel production, 
which is currently dominated by oil refining. In this subsector, oil refining continues to 
play a dominant role throughout much of the century, and total combined output of 
other fuels from new energy production technologies only surpasses petroleum output 
after 2080 (as shown in Figure 2). These new energy production technologies comprise 
hydrogen synthesis technologies based on steam reforming of natural gas, pyrolysis of 
biomass and partial oxidation of coal. In this baseline scenario, penetration and uptake 
of biomass- and coal-based hydrogen synthesis technologies is relatively rapid in the 
second half of the century, and total hydrogen output in 2100 is roughly equivalent to 
refinery throughput in 2000. The fact that coal-based hydrogen production is supported 
may initially seem surprising when one considers the impact of a GHG tax, but occurs 
nonetheless because it represents a more efficient way of utilising the energy in coal 
where the resulting hydrogen is used in a fuel cell and, more importantly, is amenable to 
carbon capture. Synthesis of hydrogen via reforming of methane is not attractive, 
mainly because gas is already a relatively low-emissions and flexible energy carrier.  
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Figure 2: Global fuel conversion, baseline scenario (with GHG abatement policy) 
Figure 2 shows that the other fuel production technologies that achieve significant 
market penetration include Fischer-Tropsch liquids synthesis and alcohol production 
from biomass. The attraction of Fischer-Tropsch liquids from coal is partly explained by 
the declining availability and depletion of oil resources, and the potential to capture 
some of the carbon in the coal feedstock. Biomass-to-alcohol synthesis technology, on 
the other hand, is attractive because of it represents a zero-emissions fuel that can be 
distributed and used without the need for extensive and expensive new infrastructure or 
adoption of new vehicle technologies.  
The other main sector of interest is transportation. The choice of vehicle technologies 
under this baseline scenario is illustrated in Figure 3, which presents the total travel 
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distance accounted for by different passenger car technologies over the 21st century. The 
assumptions applied here result in an initially gradual transition away from the 
conventional petroleum ICE vehicles to natural gas-fuelled vehicles – both conventional 
ICE and hybrid electric-ICE vehicles. However, between around 2040 and 2060, the 
gasoline ICE vehicle is displaced as the dominant transport technology, and replaced by 
the gas hybrid. Hybrids continue to play a dominant role in the transport market for the 
remainder of the century, although the cost premium of the technology ensures that it is 
unable to achieve a market share of much more than 60 percent. The increasing 
availability of zero-emissions alcohol fuel in the second half of the 21st century result in 
the gradual penetration of this fuel into both the hybrid and conventional ICE market, 
and the availability of relatively cheap natural gas in some world regions also ensures 
that the conventional ICE technology maintains a significant market share, even though 
gasoline plays almost no role by 2100. 
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Figure 3 Global technology and fuel choice for passenger car travel, baseline scenario 
(with GHG abatement policy) 
The only other energy-related technologies that we will mention here are those for 
carbon capture and storage (CCS). These technologies are attractive under this scenario, 
and by 2100 around 2.0 Gt of carbon are captured annually (which is close to 14 percent 
of energy-related CO2 emissions – see below). Over 80 percent of this carbon is 
captured from IGCC plants, and in hydrogen and synthetic fuel production, with 
technologies that capture carbon from post-combustion flue gases remaining relatively 
unattractive despite the climate change mitigation policies assumed under this baseline 
scenario. 
3.2.2 Technology costs 
The technological development of the energy system described above and presented in 
Figures 1-3 is driven by a number of factors, including among others the GHG tax, 
resource availability potentials, and absolute and relative market penetration constraints. 
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However, two of the most important factors affecting technology choice are the cost and 
performance of competing technologies.  
These in turn are affected by technology learning – both learning-by-searching and 
learning-by-doing – which are determined by the R&D budget allocation (see ICCS-
NTUA 2005), and experience with the manufacture, installation and operation of 
technologies. Table 2 presents the development of capital costs of some key learning 
technologies under this baseline scenario based on costs and learning parameters from 
Kouvaritakis and Panos (2005). However, as mentioned above, it is important to 
appreciate that technology cost and performance are only two of a number of factors 
that affect technology adoption. 
The importance of other factors is illustrated when we look at the cost of nuclear 
generation in Table 2. This technology remains relatively expensive compared to other 
forms of generation, yet plays a major role in the electricity market at the end of the 
century because of depletion of gas resources, and the impact of the GHG tax on the 
competitiveness of coal-fired generation. This is also the case with most renewables, 
with the share of wind turbines limited by the availability of suitable sites. 
Clearly, by the end of the 21st century fuel cells are the cheapest form of electricity 
generation capacity. However, the challenges associated with mobilising resources for 
hydrogen production, and developing the necessary distribution infrastructure constrain 
the penetration of this technology (as seen in Figure 1). This highlights that in order to 
fully exploit the potential of fuel cell technologies, there may be a need to develop a 
long-term strategy for development and investment to co-ordinate hydrogen production, 
distribution and utilisation. Table 2 shows, however, that the extensive experience with 
and R&D investment in stationary fuel cell electricity generation technologies is unable 
to bring down the cost of fuel cells sufficiently to make them attractive in the private 
automobile market. This explains the technology mix for the transport sector presented 
in Figure 3, after accounting for resource constraints that promote the adoption of the 
more-expensive hybrid electric vehicles. 
Of the other technologies presented in Table 2, the cheapest hydrogen production 
technology is not utilised because of competing demands for limited natural gas 
resources, whereas for carbon capture technologies, the investment cost per unit of 
energy processed is not the most important factor – instead, the cost of capture per tonne 
of carbon and whether the base electricity or hydrogen production technology is 
attractive are of more importance. This explains why the carbon capture technologies 
adopted are not necessarily the cheapest.  
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Table 2: Impact of technology learning on capital costs, baseline scenario (with GHG abatement policy) 
Group Technology Abbreviation 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
      €99/kW           
Conventional Coal  HCC 1,219 1,214 1,161 1,121 1,077 1,045 1,018 995 974 958 947 
Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) HCA 1,436 1,375 1,335 1,293 1,254 1,209 1,172 1,166 1,159 1,153 1,148 
Oil Conventional Thermal OLC 1,108 1,070 1,056 1,055 1,054 1,054 1,053 1,053 1,053 1,053 1,053 
Gas Turbine Combined Cycle GCC 548 535 524 517 512 510 508 507 507 507 507 
Gas Conventional Thermal GSC 986 942 920 902 892 888 884 884 884 884 884 
Gas Turbine Open Cycle GTR 384 374 357 345 337 331 327 326 325 324 324 
Gas Fuel Cell (generic stationary) GFC 11,755 5,806 2,870 1,053 691 477 336 265 234 206 186 
Nuclear (2nd and 3rd gen.) NUC 2,765 2,542 2,161 1,934 1,824 1,785 1,756 1,745 1,737 1,729 1,722 
New Nuclear (4th gen.) NNU 8,555 7,406 6,525 5,689 4,395 3,406 2,655 2,276 1,959 1,684 1,454 
Biomass BIP 2,477 2,081 2,006 1,954 1,907 1,868 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 
Large Hydro HYD 3,227 3,144 3,064 2,931 2,747 2,524 2,381 2,311 2,286 2,270 2,250 
Solar Thermal Power Plant Cylindro-Parabolic STH 3,111 2,889 2,674 2,465 2,280 2,130 2,006 1,999 1,991 1,985 1,983 
Building Integrated PV SPV 6,385 4,622 3,748 3,033 2,523 2,021 1,796 1,751 1,749 1,748 1,743 
Wind Turbines WND 1,061 957 880 813 767 737 716 713 710 709 708 
Electricity 
generation 
technologies 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell (generic stationary) HEF 11,755 5,806 2,870 1,053 691 477 336 265 234 206 186 
    
  €99/m3d                     
Hydrogen from Gas Steam Reforming (large scale) GASH2NE 46 45 36 36 36 36 36 36 35 35 35 
Hydrogen from Coal Partial Oxidation COALH2NE 117 109 104 98 92 87 82 81 80 78 78 
Hydrogen 
production 
technologies Hydrogen from Biomass Pyrolysis BIOH2NE 122 114 104 98 93 89 86 84 82 80 79 
    
  €99/vehicle                   
Conventional ICE Passenger Car  ICC/ICG/ICA 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
Hybrid Passenger Car ICH/IGH/IAH 7,700 5,834 5,402 5,102 5,004 4,956 4,918 4,900 4,888 4,879 4,873 
Hydrogen ICE-Hybrid Passenger Car IHH 11,000 9,134 8,702 8,402 8,304 8,256 7,593 7,552 7,531 7,518 7,509 
Reformer-Fuel Cell Passenger Car PFC/AFC 590,200 352,259 234,802 162,135 147,645 139,063 133,432 130,602 129,351 128,254 127,449 
Passenger car 
technologies 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell Passenger Car HFC 472,600 234,659 117,202 44,535 30,045 21,463 15,378 12,531 11,274 10,173 9,366 
    
  €99/toe input pa                   
Pre-Combustion CO2 capture (IGCC) HCACS 31 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Post-Combustion CO2 capture (Conventional Coal) HCCCS 52 26 23 22 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Post-Combustion CO2 capture (GCC) GCCCS 31 24 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
  
  €99/m3d                     
Carbon 
capture 
technologies 
Pre-Combustion CO2 capture (Hydrogen Production) H2CAS 68 68 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
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Now that we have a sense of technology development, and the forces affecting 
technology choice and the evolution of the global energy system under the baseline 
scenario, we can now return to the main focus of this analysis – to investigate how 
technology costs and rates of adoption are affected by technology support policies, 
including R&D and D&D, and the extent to which these policies can ultimately 
improve indicators of sustainability. Accordingly, below we examine the level of key 
indicators of climate change and security of energy supply under this baseline 
scenario, which establishes the benchmark against which the impact of R&D and 
D&D policies can be evaluated. 
3.2.3 Indicators of sustainability 
3.2.3.1 Climate change 
Greenhouse gas emissions represent an important link in the causal chain between 
policy instruments and climate change impacts, because the impact of any policy 
initiative on climate change indicators operates via its impact on emissions. 
Accordingly, we present in Figure 4 below the levels of global emissions and 
sequestration of different greenhouse gases under the baseline scenario. In this 
scenario, global net greenhouse gas emissions continue rising until around 2070 
where they peak at almost 22 Gt carbon equivalent per annum. Apart from a shift to 
less carbon-intensive energy sources (as discussed in Section 3.2.1), one of the main 
sources of abatement comes from sequestration – both geological and terrestrial. 
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Figure 4: Global greenhouse gas emissions, baseline scenario (with GHG abatement 
policy).  
Note: Carbon capture and storage (CCS) from energy emissions is also indicated, as are net emissions 
or sequestration from deforestation, reforestation and afforestration (DRA-forestation). 
The impact of this emissions trajectory on atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and 
CH4 is presented in Figure 5, based on output from the MAGICC climate model 
(Wigley and Raper 1997). Figure 5 also shows the uncertainty range for future CO2 
concentrations described by high and low estimates for climate sensitivity. Under this 
scenario, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide increase from around 350 
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ppmv in 2000 to around 700 ppmv in 2100. The impact of the change in atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2, CH4 and other gases on global temperature and sea-level is 
illustrated in Figure 6. Under the middle estimate of climate sensitivity (2.6 K per 
doubling of CO2 concentration), average global temperature increases to around 3.2 K 
above 1990 levels by the end of the century, while the average rise in sea level is 
more than 400 mm. In Figure 6 we again present the uncertainty range for future 
global temperature change implied by the high and low estimates of climate 
sensitivity. The extent of the uncertainty associated with this indicator needs to be 
considered when interpreting results in the remainder of this analysis, where we seek 
to explore whether technology support policies, including R&D and D&D can help to 
mitigate some of these effects of climate change.  
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Figure 5: Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane, baseline scenario 
(with GHG abatement policy) 
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Figure 6: Temperature change and sea-level rise, baseline scenario (with GHG 
abatement policy) 
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The other major element of long-term sustainability examined in this report is the 
need to maintain security of energy supply, which may be particularly challenging for 
oil and gas resources. As an indicator of global resource security and availability, the 
development of the global resources-to-production ratios for oil and gas is presented 
in Figure 7. Importantly, this indicator differs from the reserves-to-production ratio 
used to measure short-term oil security, since it seeks to incorporate all resources (not 
only identified reserves). As discussed in Section 2, resources estimates are from 
Rogner (1997) and fixed for the analysis, so the R:P ratio changes only because of 
changes in consumption, whereas reserves will change with new discoveries (of 
existing resources) and improvements in extraction technologies. Since the focus of 
this analysis is on the long term, we are more concerned with sustainability of the 
resource base, rather than the efficiency with which resources can be reclassified to 
reserves.  
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Figure 7: Global oil and gas resource-to-production ratios and European resource-to-
consumption ratios, baseline scenario (with GHG abatement policy) 
Figure 7 also presents the resource-to-consumption ratios for Europe (comprising all 
of Europe up to the borders of the former Soviet Union), to provide an indication of 
potential oil and gas self-sufficiency in this world region – or the potential 
susceptibility to a long-term disruption to international fuel trade.  
Having described they key elements of the baseline scenario, and the baseline 
indicators of climate change and security of energy supply, we can now turn to the 
impact of alternative technology policies on these indicators. 
4 Optimistic and pessimistic alternative technology R&D 
policy scenarios  
The baseline scenario described in Section 3 above illustrates just one possible 
configuration of future technological and energy system development. Of particular 
interest here is the future uncertainty associated with technology policies, and the 
implications this has for the future uptake of new technologies, transformation of the 
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energy system, and the impact on sustainability. To explore this aspect of uncertainty, 
this section examines sustainable development under two alternative scenarios of 
future public R&D support – one scenario where public energy R&D is double the 
level described in ICCS-NTUA (2005), and one where it is zero. Hereafter we refer to 
these as the optimistic and pessimistic R&D scenarios, respectively. 
Apart from alternative R&D investment, all other factors affecting the development of 
the energy system under these scenarios are identical to the baseline. Accordingly, 
this exercise helps to illustrate the specific impact of enhanced or diminished energy 
R&D support. This section presents the impact of these alternative scenarios on 
technology choice in key energy sectors and on each of the sustainability indicators of 
interest, relative to the baseline.  
4.1 Technology deployment 
Looking first at the effect of optimistic and pessimistic future energy R&D investment 
on the development of the electricity sector, Figure 8 presents generation technology 
choice relative to the baseline scenario. Figure 8 shows the change in generation from 
each technology resulting from the alternative R&D scenarios as a percentage of total 
generation in 2050 and 2100. Even though the impacts are presented as a percentage, 
the inertia in the energy system means that the greatest effects are not observed until 
later in the century.  
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Figure 8: Change in global generation under alternative R&D scenarios, relative to 
baseline (2050, 2100) 
Note: Technology abbreviations are as follows: HCC: conventional coal, HCA: advanced coal (IGCC), 
OLC: oil conventional, GCC: gas combined-cycle, GSC: gas steam cycle, GTR: gas turbine, GFC: gas 
fuel cell, BIP: biomass gasification, NUC: nuclear conventional, NNU: new nuclear, HYD: hydro, 
STH: solar thermal, STC: solar thermal cogeneration, SPV: solar photovoltaics, WND: wind turbine, 
ORE: other renewables, HEF: hydrogen fuel cell. 
Electricity generation under the pessimistic R&D scenario is almost identical to the 
baseline scenario up until 2050, and even by 2100 the divergence is small. This 
implies that other factors, such as the climate policy and resource constraints, have a 
greater influence on technology choice than government energy R&D, if we assume 
the levels under the baseline scenario. The most significant effect of the lower energy 
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R&D investment in this pessimistic scenario is to delay the development of 4th 
generation nuclear reactors. As a consequence, one of the few ways in which the 
energy system can meet rising demand while responding to the climate policy 
assumed to apply in this scenario is to rely more heavily on 3rd generation nuclear 
reactors, with some additional generation from coal, biomass and some other 
renewables.  
The optimistic R&D scenario results in a more significant, although still small 
transformation of the global electricity sector by 2100 by promoting gas fuel cell and 
combined cycle generation almost entirely at the expense of hydrogen fuel cell and 
coal-based generation. However, the gas and hydrogen fuel cell technologies are very 
similar, and affected by R&D investment in much the same way so this result cannot 
be attributed to any purely technological edge of gas fuel cells in electricity 
generation, and instead must be related to other factors, including cost and availability 
of gas and hydrogen. Similarly, the shift away from coal-fired generation can be 
attributed partly to the impact of the climate change mitigation policy, but it remains 
unclear how the higher levels of R&D investment are able to increase the contribution 
of gas-based electricity generation, remembering that in the baseline scenario gas 
became increasingly scarce towards the end of the century. To answer this question 
we clearly need to explore the development of other energy sectors, which we briefly 
discuss below.  
One potentially important sector is transportation, where a number of new 
technologies, including new powertrains (such as fuel cells and hybrids) and new 
energy systems (such as advanced batteries, reformers and hydrogen storage) 
compete. However, as shown in Figure 9, a reduction in government energy R&D has 
little impact on the future choice of transportation technologies under the assumptions 
used here. The necessity to shift away from, or use more efficiently oil and gas 
resources is a more pressing concern than avoiding technologies that are slightly more 
expensive because of lower R&D support – in other words, it is still attractive to 
deploy technologies such as hybrid vehicles under this pessimistic scenario, even 
though lower R&D investment means they are less mature. 
These same factors affect technology choice under the optimistic R&D investment 
scenario, but the additional R&D instead accelerates technology development. The 
impact is shown in Figure 10 where by expanding the suite of competitive vehicle 
technologies the optimistic R&D scenario radically transforms the development of 
this sector. Figure 10 shows a rapid transition from the conventional gasoline ICE 
through alcohol ICEs and gas hybrids to hydrogen fuel cell vehicles.  
Clearly, the additional R&D investment creates a more effective and competitive way 
of meeting climate change mitigation goals and reducing reliance on fossil fuels. This 
occurs almost entirely because of the impact of the additional R&D on fuel cell 
competitiveness (see Appendix, Tables A1 and A2). This in turn facilitates an earlier 
penetration of this technology into both stationary and mobile markets, which in turn 
leads to additional learning-by-doing and further improvements in competitiveness. 
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Figure 9: Global technology and fuel choice for passenger car travel, pessimistic R&D 
scenario (with GHG abatement policy) 
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Figure 10: Global technology and fuel choice for passenger car travel, optimistic R&D 
scenario (with GHG abatement policy) 
This overall transformation of the passenger transport sector under this optimistic 
scenario provides one explanation for the results observed in Figure 8 for the 
electricity sector. Specifically, the lower reliance on natural gas in the transport sector 
allows greater use of gas in electricity generation. As we saw in Table 2, even under 
the baseline scenario gas-fired electricity generation technologies were among the 
most competitive, so it is not surprising that under this optimistic scenario there is 
more generation from natural gas. Moreover, the quantity of hydrogen demanded by 
the transport sector reduces availability in other sectors, which partly explains the 
preference for gas over hydrogen fuel cells in electricity generation under the 
optimistic scenario (see Figure 8). 
One would assume that such a marked shift to an alternative development path may 
have implications for sustainable development, particularly since there appears to be 
greater reliance on low- and zero-emissions fuels under the optimistic R&D scenario. 
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The following section examines the impact of this alternative development path on 
indicators of sustainable development. 
4.2 Sustainability indicators 
The impact on greenhouse gas emissions of the two alternative government energy 
R&D scenarios relative to the baseline scenario is presented in Figure 11. Not 
surprisingly, the impact under the pessimistic scenario is very small, which is 
consistent with the relatively unchanged development path of the energy system under 
this scenario. The optimistic scenario also has relatively little impact on emissions 
until late in the century, where it contributes to a substantial decline (2 Gt C-e pa) in 
total annual emissions. However, as shown in Figure 12, this results in only a 
relatively small decline in atmospheric CO2 concentrations relative to the baseline 
scenario, because emissions for most of the century are only slightly below the 
baseline trajectory. The pessimistic scenario leads to an atmospheric CO2 
concentration almost identical to that under the baseline scenario. 
Moving along the causal chain from emissions through to climate impacts, Figure 13 
presents the change in average global temperature compared to the baseline scenario. 
These impacts on temperature are small, and somewhat counter-intuitive – for 
example, the lower emissions and CO2 concentrations under the optimistic scenario 
result in a higher temperature because emissions of sulfur oxides (SOx) (from coal 
combustion and a precursor of sulfate aerosols with negative forcing) are also reduced 
under this scenario. Accordingly, in Figure 13 we also show the impact on 
temperature assuming constant levels of atmospheric sulphate, which exhibits a path 
that is more consistent with emissions and concentrations. However, this is an 
artificial construction since SOx emissions are declining in all scenarios and this is 
merely accelerated under the optimistic scenario because of a faster phase-out of coal.  
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Figure 11: Change in global GHG emissions under alternative R&D policy scenarios, 
relative to baseline 
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Figure 12: Change in atmospheric CO2 concentrations under alternative R&D 
scenarios, relative to baseline 
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Figure 13: Change in global temperature and sea level under alternative R&D scenarios, 
relative to baseline 
Importantly, however, for essentially all of the climate change indicators the most 
significant change occurs at the end of the century. Accordingly, for the remainder of 
this analysis of climate change indicators and impacts in this report we focus on the 
year 2100. 
Turning now to the other set of indicators of sustainability, the effect on security of oil 
supply of the optimistic and pessimistic government energy R&D scenarios is 
presented in Figure 14. This figure shows the change in the global resources-to-
production ratio (R:P), and the change in the resources-to-consumption ratio (R:C) in 
Europe (comprising Europe up to the borders of the Former Soviet Union). It should 
be remembered that this resources-to-production ratio differs from the commonly 
reported reserves-to-production ratio (for example, BP 2004), in that it is based on 
total recoverable resources, rather than current levels of identified reserves. Looking 
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at the results for R:P and R:C, for most of the first half of the 21st century neither 
policy has a significant impact on the energy security ratios, but this changes by 2040-
2050. Between 2050 and 2070, under the optimistic scenario the resources-to-
production ratio for oil is extended by 1.1-1.9 years, equivalent to up to a 6 percent 
increase in the ratio, which may be sufficient to reduce vulnerability to supply 
disruptions. At the same time, the resource-to-consumption ratio for oil in Europe is 
increased by a similar relative amount. However, this coincides with a larger 
(although transient) reduction in the R:C ratio for gas in Europe (see Figure 15).  
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Figure 14: Change in global and European oil resource-to-production and -consumption 
ratios under alternative R&D scenarios, relative to baseline 
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Figure 15: Change in global and European gas resource-to-production and -
consumption ratios under alternative R&D scenarios, relative to baseline 
This improvement in oil supply security under the optimistic R&D scenario is most 
likely indirectly attributable to the rapid shift to fuel cell vehicles. As discussed this 
alternative development path for the transportation sector alleviates some pressure 
from this sector on natural gas resources compared to the baseline scenario. Gas is a 
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relatively low-emissions, clean and convenient fuel and the supplies freed up by a 
shift to hydrogen fuel cell vehicles can be used in other sectors, including in 
electricity generation, direct combustion and other forms of transport, where the 
greenhouse policy favours gas over oil. As a consequence, oil demand is reduced and 
the lifespan of resources is extended. However, this change does not persist, and 
increasing natural gas scarcity means that these expanded oil resources are eventually 
exploited (as seen in Figure 14). 
This preference for natural gas means that under the optimistic R&D scenario the 
global resources-to-production ratio for this fuel is reduced early in the century 
(troughing in 2030), as seen in Figure 15, but the shift back to oil towards the end of 
the century eventually improves gas security of supply compared to the baseline. The 
pessimistic scenario, however, has a much smaller impact. Critically for long-term 
security of supply, the largest reduction in the global R:P ratio occurs at a time when 
global gas resources are still relatively abundant (2030, see Figure 7). This means this 
decline is less likely to have a significant impact on the likelihood or severity of 
supply disruptions. However, in Europe the largest decrease in the R:C ratio occurs in 
2060, at a time when cheap gas resources have been largely exhausted, posing a 
potentially larger threat. Accordingly, for both oil and gas we focus on this period in 
subsequent analysis throughout this report. 
4.3 Impacts 
As discussed in Section 1, we are interested in measuring the impact of a change in 
R&D investment on the indicators of sustainability described above. This impact is 
defined as the change in the indicator, divided by the change in expenditure. Although 
this formulation is defined specifically for the standardised R&D shock exercise in the 
following section, it is possible to apply it to these optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios. 
We have already seen the change in the various indicators which represent the 
sustainable-development objectives of interest, so it is a relatively simple matter to 
divide these changes by the change in global government R&D expenditure relative to 
the baseline scenario. In the baseline scenario, government energy R&D investment 
on the technologies included in this modelling framework amounted to approximately 
€400 billion (undiscounted) between 2000 and 2050. Accordingly, the optimistic 
scenario is based on expenditure of around double this amount, while government 
energy R&D expenditure is assumed to be zero in the pessimistic scenario.  
The impacts per billion euros of R&D expenditure under these scenarios are presented 
in Table 3. The units for the impact on each indicator are also indicated. So, for 
example, additional expenditure per year of $100 billion over the next 50 years 
reduces atmospheric CO2 concentrations by approximately 2 ppm. On the other hand, 
reducing R&D expenditure by the same amount would increase concentrations by 
only 0.2 ppm. Similar differences in the impact magnitude between increases and 
decreases are observed for all indicators in Table 3. This is consistent with the results 
for the pessimistic scenario presented throughout Section 4, which do not diverge 
substantially from the baseline scenario results. 
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Table 3: Impacts on sustainability indicators of alternative R&D scenarios 
Indicator Impact 
 
Reduced 
investment 
(Pessimistic) 
Additional 
investment 
(Optimistic) Units 
CO2 conc. (2100) -2.0E-03 -2.0E-02 ppm/€bn 
CH4 conc. (2100) 1.6E-03 -1.7E-02 ppb/€bn 
Temperature (2100) -5.6E-06 7.2E-05 K/€bn 
Temperature (2100) (constant sulfate) -6.6E-06 -5.7E-05 K/€bn 
Sea-level (2100) -4.7E-05 4.5E-04 cm/€bn 
Security of oil supply (2060) -5.7E-05 4.3E-03 years/€bn 
Security of gas supply (2060) 4.8E-04 -1.8E-03 years/€bn 
 
The fact that the pessimistic scenario does not diverge from the status quo implies that 
the level of government energy R&D investment assumed in the baseline scenario has 
a relatively insignificant impact on energy system development compared to that of 
other factors, such as the climate policy and resource constraints. This is not to say 
there is no place for government R&D in promoting new energy technologies, and the 
potential for such investment to transform the energy system is demonstrated by the 
impact of the optimistic R&D scenario. Clearly, the relationship between total R&D 
expenditure and the impact on indicators of sustainable development is non-linear. 
However, this analysis also shows that simply doubling energy R&D with little 
forethought in terms of overall strategy, targeting and consistency with other goals, is 
a very expensive way to achieve policy objectives. The next section attempts to go 
some way towards identifying the specific technologies that represent key targets for 
policy support and future R&D investment, with the aim of developing more cost-
effective strategies for achieving desired sustainability outcomes. 
5 Standardised R&D and D&D investment shocks 
We now examine the impact of energy-related R&D and D&D investment on 
indicators of sustainability, focusing on climate change and security of energy supply. 
R&D investment is assumed to contribute to the development of new technologies 
and the improvement of some existing technologies. However, it should be 
emphasised that the process of technological change is highly uncertain, and so our 
analysis of the impact of R&D support programs can only provide a guide in terms of 
the impact of particular investment strategies. In this analysis, the impact of R&D on 
the development of a particular technology is assumed to manifest as a decrease in the 
cost deploying that technology, and possibly related technologies. This may accelerate 
commercialisation of a new technology, or improve the competitiveness of an existing 
technology, facilitating more extensive deployment. 
We also examine the impact of demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs, 
which contribute to the accumulation of valuable experience with a particular 
technology in the marketplace. For instance, a successful introduction of a technology 
in niche markets can contribute to build up the confidence of potential users, 
equipment manufacturers and other social actors, such as policy makers. As a result of 
this experience, the technology performance and/or cost may improve, and these 
improvements may spillover to related technologies (see Turton and Barreto 2003 and 
Kouvaritakis and Panos 2005 for a discussion of the implementation of the clusters 
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approach to learning in the SAPIENTIA project). Accordingly, strategic management 
of niche markets, where the technology may be attractive due to specific advantages 
or particular applications, may be important for stimulating the diffusion process of a 
given technology or cluster of related and/or complementary technologies (Kemp 
1997).  
As mentioned in Section 1, for the evaluation of the impacts of R&D and D&D 
programs we apply the notion of “shocks”, i.e., one-off incremental investments in 
either research and development, or demonstration and deployment at the beginning 
of the time horizon (the year 2000). However, we treat these two shocks slightly 
differently to account for how R&D or D&D shocks are most likely and practicably 
implemented. Specifically, deployment and demonstration shocks are assumed to 
result in the installation of new and additional capacity of an entire technology (for 
example, a combined cycle gas turbine power station), which may comprise several 
independent components (such as a gas turbine, steam turbine and recovery boiler). 
The rationale behind this approach is that it is not possible to deploy a single 
component without also installing the rest of the system necessary for its operation. 
On the other hand, R&D shocks can be targeted at either an entire technology or 
towards individual components that cannot be deployed independently (for example, 
an on-board reformer for a fuel cell vehicle). Consequently, D&D shocks applied to 
one technology can directly stimulate the learning process for common components 
used by other technologies, whereas R&D shocks tend to be specific to a single 
technology, and spillover benefits mainly occur when the R&D shock leads indirectly 
to additional technology installations. 
In this analysis we report the result of orthogonal R&D shocks and D&D shocks. The 
size of the R&D shock for each technology is set at 20 percent of cumulative R&D 
expenditure as at 2000 for that technology. By standardizing the size of the R&D 
shocks we ensure that we do not apply absurdly large investments to infant 
technologies (which are likely to saturate any response and reduce the impact per unit 
of expenditure), or unrealistically small shocks to mature technologies compared to 
the current levels of R&D investment. Through this approach, it is hoped that the 
results will better provide policy makers with a clearer indication of the potential 
impact on sustainability indicators of a given investment in R&D.  
However, for D&D shocks we take a slightly different approach, and apply a one-off 
shock of 10 billion euros (€1999) to each energy technology of interest. Using a 
similar approach to that applied in the EC-sponsored MINIMA-SUD project (Barreto 
and Turton 2005), a standard D&D shock size has been chosen in order to be able to 
compare the effects of D&D shocks for different technologies on a common basis. 
Unlike R&D shocks, it is not necessary to standardise relative to previous investment 
because this is implicitly accounted for by the higher investment costs of less mature 
technologies. That is, ceteris paribus, €10 billion buys less capacity of an immature 
technology than a mature technology, so the new capacity installed as a result of the 
shock is already somewhat standardised.  
It should be noted that the D&D shocks applied for this exercise account for the total 
capital cost of deploying new capacity. This is important because, in reality, a policy-
maker (i.e., a government) may not need to pay this entire cost, but rather the 
difference in cost between the target technology and the technology that would have 
been deployed in the absence of policy intervention.  
 24
Like the R&D shocks, the D&D shocks shed some light into which technology would 
provide a larger “return-on-investment” in terms of the impact on sustainability 
indicators if a corresponding D&D program of the above-mentioned size were 
implemented. In doing so, the use of a standard size for the D&D shock greatly 
facilitates the comparison across technologies. As mentioned earlier, this analysis 
seeks to calculate “impacts” defined as the ratio ∆-Indicator/Instrument Cost, where 
“∆-indicator” is computed as the change relative to the baseline scenario. The costs of 
either R&D or D&D programs are measured at “face value”, i.e., as the respective 
R&D and D&D expenditures that constitute a shock. 
Table 4: Description and abbreviations of technologies in the electricity generation, fuel 
production, passenger-car and carbon capture sectors for which R&D and D&D 
investment shocks were performed. 
Sector Technology Description Abbreviation Type of shock 
    D&D R&D 
Coal Conventional Thermal HCC   x 
Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle HCA x x 
Oil Conventional Thermal OLC  x 
Gas Turbine Combined Cycle GCC x x 
Gas Conventional Thermal GSC  x 
Gas Turbine Open Cycle GTR x x 
Gas Fuel Cell (generic stationary) GFC x a 
Nuclear (2nd and 3rd gen.) NUC  x 
New Nuclear (4th gen.) NNU x x 
Biomass BIP x x 
Large Hydro HYD  x 
Solar Thermal STH x x 
Photovoltaic SPV x x 
Wind Turbines Onshore WND x x 
Electricity 
generation 
technologies 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell (generic stationary) HEF x a 
Hydrogen from Gas Steam Reforming  GASH2NE x x 
Hydrogen from Coal Partial Oxidation COALH2NE x x 
Hydrogen 
production 
technologies Hydrogen from Biomass Pyrolysis BIOH2NE x x 
Gasoline-powered hybrid-ICE-electric car ICH x b 
Gas-powered hybrid-ICE-electric car IGH x b 
Alcohol-powered hybrid-ICE-electric car IAH x b 
Hydrogen-powered hybrid-ICE-electric car IHH x b 
Gasoline-powered fuel-cell car PFC x a 
Alcohol-powered fuel-cell car AFC x a 
Passenger 
transport 
technologies 
Hydrogen-powered fuel-cell car HFC x a 
Pre-Combustion CO2 capture (Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle) HCACS x x 
Post-Combustion CO2 capture (Conventional Coal) HCCCS x x 
Post-Combustion CO2 capture (Gas Turbine 
Combined Cycle) GCCCS x x 
Carbon capture 
technologies 
Pre-Combustion CO2 capture (Hydrogen 
production) H2CAS x x 
Generic fuel cell component FCMS  x 
Hybrid-electric vehicle component HYBV  x 
Pure electric vehicle component ELVT  x 
Technology 
components 
Hybrid battery system component HYBB  x 
a
 R&D shock benefits technology through impact on “Generic fuel cell component.” 
b
 R&D shock benefits technology through impact “Hybrid-electric vehicle component”, “Pure electric 
vehicle component” and ‘Hybrid battery system component.” 
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Orthogonal shocks have been performed for electricity generation, fuel production, 
passenger vehicle, carbon capture technologies and system components. The list of 
technologies, their abbreviations and the types of shocks applied are presented in 
Table 4. In the last section in the main analysis that follows (Section 5.4), we also 
examine the effects of non-orthogonal shocks combining R&D and D&D shocks. 
As shown in Table 4, although R&D shocks are applied to all technologies assumed to 
benefit from learning-by-searching, not all technologies that may benefit from 
learning-by-doing are subjected to a D&D shock. This is because in many cases it is 
not considered realistic that additional public support would be provided to 
technologies considered to be mature or competitive, such as conventional coal, 
nuclear, large hydro and conventional oil generation.  
In all cases, it is important to remember that the ultimate impact of any shock depends 
on many factors, limited not only to technology learning and clustering but also 
constraints on market penetration, resource potentials, costs and availability, and the 
climate change policy assumed also for these shock exercises. 
5.1 An illustrative R&D policy shock 
Before we present the results for all of the technologies in Table 4 that are assumed to 
benefit from learning-by-searching, it is helpful to present first in detail a single 
illustrative R&D shock.4 The example presented here illustrates some of the possible 
ways in which R&D expenditure on a single technology can affect not only the 
competitiveness of that technology and through it the development of the energy 
system, but can also result in indirect spillovers that affect other unrelated 
technologies. By illustrating the effects elicited by a single shock, this example helps 
show how counter-intuitive results can arise – a fact that should be borne in mind 
when interpreting the results in Section 5.2 where we compare results from a large 
number of R&D shocks.  
The example presented here is an R&D expenditure shock to the fuel cell technology. 
Specifically, a shock of 20 percent of cumulative R&D expenditure was applied in the 
base year (2000) to the generic fuel cell technology. This is estimated to be roughly 
equivalent to $7.5 billion in R&D expenditure (from a combination of private-sector 
and government), or slightly more than 1.1 percent of cumulative global energy R&D 
for energy conversion and transport as at 2000 (Kouvaritakis and Panos 2005).  
As described in Kouvaritakis and Panos (2005), one 2FL equation is used to represent 
the capital cost of all fuel cell technologies, comprising both stationary and mobile 
technologies. As a consequence, an R&D shock on the generic fuel cell technology is 
expected to benefit a number of diverse applications of fuel cells. Furthermore, 
because many of these different fuel cell applications compete in entirely separate 
energy and technology markets, the impact on the development of the energy system 
has the potential to be wide-reaching.5 In addition, the effect of an R&D shock is 
                                               
4
 Note, for comparison, the impact of an illustrative D&D shock is reported in Barreto and Turton 
(2005) – a report prepared for the EC-sponsored MINIMA-SUD project. 
5
 As we saw in Section 4, the impact on fuels cells of the optimistic R&D scenario resulted in 
significant changes to the energy system. 
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likely to be reinforced by the impact of learning-by-doing, and a small competitive 
advantage afforded by an R&D shock may translate into the realization of a wholly 
different technological development path. 
The impact on the future energy system of an R&D shock on the generic fuel cell 
technology is described below. Figure 16 compares the global electricity generation 
mix under this R&D shock with the baseline scenario across a number of timepoints 
in the 21st century.  
Figure 16 appears to show that the overall impact on the electricity sector, both in 
scope and scale, is very similar to that presented for the optimistic R&D scenario in 
Figure 8. The main elements comprise a shift from hydrogen to gas fuel cells, 
increased generation from other gas-fired technologies, and lower generation from 
coal. Importantly, as in the optimistic scenario, total electricity generation from 
stationary fuel cells is largely unchanged from the baseline scenario – that is, under 
the assumptions used here fuel cells are already competitive in this sector without the 
R&D shock. However, in the transport sector the shock has a major effect on FC 
competitiveness, although again the result is similar to the optimistic R&D scenario 
from Section 4, as shown in Figure 17. 
Accordingly, under the modelling and policy assessment framework assumptions used 
here, the R&D shock applied solely to fuel cells (approximately €7.5bn) results in 
much the same transformation of the electricity and transport sectors (and the energy 
system as a whole, for that matter) as the much larger-scale additional R&D 
investment (>€400bn) in the optimistic scenario. The effect on key indicators of 
sustainability is also much the same, as shown in Table 5, although the impacts are 
approximately 50-fold higher because the R&D expenditure is much more efficiently 
targeted. 
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Figure 16: Change in global electricity generation under fuel cell R&D shock, relative to 
baseline (2020, 2050, 2080, 2100) 
Note: Technology abbreviations are as follows: HCC: conventional coal, HCA: advanced coal (IGCC), 
OLC: oil conventional, GCC: gas combined-cycle, GSC: gas steam cycle, GTR: gas turbine, GFC: gas 
fuel cell, BIP: biomass gasification, NUC: nuclear conventional, NNU: new nuclear, HYD: hydro, 
STH: solar thermal, STC: solar thermal cogeneration, SPV: solar photovoltaics, WND: wind turbine, 
ORE: other renewables, HEF: hydrogen fuel cell. 
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Figure 17: Global technology and fuel choice for passenger car travel with fuel cell R&D 
shock 
Table 5: Calculation of impact on sustainability indicators of fuel cell R&D shock 
Indicator Baseline Shock ∆ Percentage Impact 
    
 
 Units 
CO2 conc. (2100) (ppm) 702 695 -7.3 -1.04 -0.98 ppm/€bn 
CH4 conc. (2100) (ppm) 2539 2532 -6.9 -0.27 -0.92 ppb/€bn 
Temperature change (K) 
(2100) 3.24 3.27 0.032 0.99 4.29E-03 K/€bn 
Temperature change (K) 
(2100) (constant sulfate) 2.73 2.71 
-
0.020 -0.75 -2.72E-03 K/€bn 
Sea-level rise (cm) (2100) 40.8 41.0 0.21 0.51 0.028 cm/€bn 
Oil resource-to-production 
ratio (years) (2060) 32.6 33.7 1.2 3.62 0.16 years/€bn 
Gas resource-to-production 
ratio (years) (2060) 45.2 44.4 -0.8 -1.80 -0.11 years/€bn 
Note: rounding errors mean that reported ∆s may differ from the apparent difference between the 
‘Baseline’ and ‘Shock’ cases. The raw results are reported in Appendix Tables A3 and A4. 
These results imply that well-targetted investments aimed at key technologies have 
the potential to substantially change the development of the energy system, although 
the impact on indicators of sustainability over this timeframe is generally small. 
However, when combined with complementary initiatives, additional R&D 
investment may have the potential to contribute to the realization of sustainability 
objectives. We now examine whether other R&D shocks are also able to improve 
sustainability indicators, with the following section summarising the results of the 
standardised R&D shocks for all of the technologies indicated in Table 4.  
5.2 Summary of orthogonal R&D investment shocks 
This section explores in brief the impact of a series of independent R&D investments 
in the base year (2000), on the main sustainable-development indicators discussed in 
Section 1. Detailed results from this orthogonal shock exercise are presented in the 
Appendix (Tables A3 and A4). Importantly, the results reported here comprise 
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entirely “impacts”, rather than indicator levels. That is, for each sustainable 
development indicator we present only the change in that indicator (relative to the 
baseline scenario described in Section 3) per billion euros of additional R&D 
investment. The detailed example in Section 5.1 for the fuel cell component illustrated 
how these impacts are calculated. 
As we saw also in this example, although the magnitude of the changes that an R&D 
shock induces on the energy system may be large using this methodology, the impact 
on sustainability indicators can be small. This is confirmed for most shocks in 
Figure 18, which presents the impact on atmospheric CO2 concentration at the end of 
the century under each shock. The biggest impacts appear to occur when an R&D 
shock is applied to either of two carbon capture technologies (GCCCS and HCCCS), 
and the biomass-to-hydrogen production technology (BIOH2NE).6 However, these 
also happen to be three of the technologies that have historically received the least 
R&D support, and since the size of the shock is standardised to cumulative historical 
R&D investment, these technologies receive relatively small shocks (less than €50 
million). This tends to exaggerate the size of any impact, even if insignificant. 
Accordingly, we also present the impacts from a €1 billion shock to each of these 
technologies (in addition, we apply the same shock also to two other carbon capture 
technologies (HCACS, H2CAS) and coal-to-H2 production (COALH2NE), which 
have also historically received very little R&D support). The impacts under the €1 
billion shock are much lower, in both relative and in most cases absolute terms, which 
indicates that these shocks do not have a particularly significant impact on 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations, or any impact saturates at very low levels of 
additional R&D support. 
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Figure 18: Impact of R&D shocks on atmospheric CO2 concentrations in the year 2100, 
relative to baseline 
Note: For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 4 on page 24. Impacts are reported in a way that 
is consistent with the change in the underlying indicator, so that a negative impact means the indicator 
decreased, and a positive impact means the indicator increased.  
                                               
6
 For description of abbreviations, see Table 4 on page 24. 
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Taking this into account, the biggest impact occurs with the R&D shock applied to the 
generic fuel cell technology. The impact of the R&D shock on solar thermal 
electricity generation may also be significant, but the absolute change in concentration 
was very small under this shock, however the size of the shock is just above €1 
billion.  
This result highlights the potential importance of fuel cells in a scenario based on the 
assumptions applied here. Conversely, for many other technologies it appears that 
these assumptions, such as the climate policy, resource endowments, and penetration 
and diffusion constraints for new technologies, are more significant than the impact of 
the R&D shock. In some ways this is a consequence of using a perfect-foresight 
model, which has a tendency to either install a technology to the maximum allowable 
extent or not to install it at all. Generally speaking then, an R&D shock will only have 
an impact when it results in an uncompetitive technology becoming competitive. Of 
course, both the model and reality are more complex this, and regional characteristics, 
the existence of niche markets and other factors mean that this “all-or-nothing” 
behavior will not necessarily occur. 
However, it is important to stress the significance of the climate policy assumed in 
this analysis (see Section 3.1.1) when interpreting these results. Under the baseline 
scenario (with no R&D shocks) all GHG abatement opportunities that cost less than 
the rate of the GHG tax used to represent the climate policy are exploited, and this 
determines total emissions (and hence climate impacts). Accordingly, an R&D shock 
will only produce additional abatement if it reduces the cost of some of the abatement 
opportunities from above the GHG tax rate to below the GHG tax rate. This means 
that if the R&D shock makes abatement opportunities that are already competitive 
slightly cheaper, it will not reduce emissions (although it will reduce total system 
costs). On the other hand, if the R&D shock makes uncompetitive abatement slightly 
cheaper, but not cheaper than the GHG tax rate, it will have no significant impact on 
technology choice. This is illustrated in Figure 19. Accordingly, the stringency of the 
climate mitigation policy can have a significant bearing on the potential impact of an 
R&D shock. A different climate policy would be expected to change the relative 
impact of R&D shocks applied to different technologies, and may identify alternative 
technologies as possible targets for R&D support. This was seen, for example, for a 
combination of D&D shocks and GHG taxes in the EC-sponsored MINIMA-SUD 
project (Barreto and Turton 2005). 
We now turn to some of the other sustainability indicators, and in Figure 20 we 
present the impact of the R&D shock on temperature in 2100. In this figure, we report 
only the larger shocks for those technologies for which the standardised shocks are 
very small (GCCCS, HCCCS, HCACS, H2CAS and BIOH2NE). The full results for 
these technologies are available in the Appendix (Tables A3 and A4), but once again, 
the absolute change in the indicator is effectively unchanged under the larger R&D 
shock indicating that these shocks do not have a significant impact or saturate at very 
low levels.7  
                                               
7
 Except for the shock applied to BIOH2NE, where the direction of the change in the indicator changes 
as the size is increased. Again, this implies that the impact is insignificant. 
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Figure 19: Illustration of impact of shock on level of GHG abatement 
Figure 20 presents temperature change including and excluding the impact of sulfate 
aerosols. Looking first at the series with constant aerosol emissions, we see results 
that are entirely consistent with those for concentration in Figure 18 – with the largest 
impact on temperature occurring under the R&D shock to the fuel cell technology. As 
with concentrations, the effect with the solar thermal (STH) technology also appears 
to be significant, although the absolute change is very small (and this is the case for 
all the other technologies). When the impact on emissions of sulfate aerosols is also 
included, the picture is substantially different. The fuel cell shock goes from reducing 
temperature to increasing temperature because it displaces coal use (primarily coal-
fired electricity generation as shown in Section 5.1), and presumably this also happens 
with the solar thermal shock. 
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Figure 20: Impact of R&D shocks on global average temperature in the year 2100, 
realtive to baseline 
Note: For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 4 on page 24. Impacts are reported in a way that 
is consistent with the change in the underlying indicator, so that a negative impact means the indicator 
decreased, and a positive impact means the indicator increased. 
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This leads to the somewhat perverse conclusion that one possible way of effectively 
mitigating climate change impacts is to support technologies that produce emissions 
of sulfur oxides (but minimal GHG emissions), whereas supporting the technology 
that is the most effective at reducing carbon emissions results in a higher global 
average temperature. However, this result occurs partly because adoption of fuel cells 
is still somewhat constrained, which implies that other factors limiting the deployment 
of fuel cell technologies also need to be addressed, in conjunction with any R&D 
policy support. These include the need to both mobilise new resources and 
technologies for hydrogen production, and finance the cost of establishing the 
necessary infrastructure for hydrogen distribution, possibly through public-private 
partnerhships. Demand-pull measures may also be need to accelerate market 
acceptance of new technologies, including procurement programs, tax credits and 
other measures. 
The last sustainable-development indicator that we will present in this section is the 
global resources-to-production ratio for oil and gas in the year 2060. The impact on 
this indicator for each R&D shock is presented in Figure 21, where the largest 
positive impact on oil security occurs with the shock applied to the generic fuel cell 
technology. In addition, shocks to biomass- and coal-to-hydrogen (BIOH2NE 
COALH2NE), hybrid vehicle battery systems (HYBB) and carbon capture from 
advanced coal (HCACS) also apparently have a positive impact. This indicates that 
support for hydrogen technologies can potentially result in early deployment of these 
technologies, providing a flexible and convenient alternative to gas and oil. In 
addition, supporting technologies that improve the efficiency of oil consumption, such 
as the hybrid battery system can also extend oil availability.  
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Figure 21: Impact of R&D shocks on global oil and gas resource-to-production ratios in 
2060, relative to baseline 
Note: For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 4 on page 24. Impacts are reported in a way that 
is consistent with the change in the underlying indicator, so that a negative impact means the indicator 
decreased, and a positive impact means the indicator increased. 
Interestingly, the R&D shock to solar thermal generation worsens oil security, as do a 
number of other shocks targeted at technologies that may be able to contribute to a 
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substitution of other energy sources for oil. This also occurs with gas security for 
many of the shocks. The explanation of why many of the shocks result in lower 
security for gas (and in some cases oil) is that the climate change policy appears to 
gear the energy system towards displacing coal. Consequently, if a shock can create 
additional ways of replacing coal with other fuels, including gas (and in some cases 
oil), then these are likely to be exploited resulting in lower R:P ratios. The fact that 
gas and oil are used, even though renewable and nuclear energy can theoretically 
displace coal, appears to be because most of the cost-effective nuclear and renewable 
options are already exploited under the baseline scenario; which is also why shocks to 
nuclear and renewable technologies have little impact. One exception appears to be 
solar thermal generation, but the R&D shock to this technology also appears to create 
additional opportunities to use oil, most likely to displace coal.  
This concludes the more detailed discussion of the standardised R&D shocks. Those 
sustainability indicators not discussed in detail, including changes in atmospheric 
methane concentration, sea-level rise, and security of energy supply in Europe, are 
presented quantitatively in the Appendix.  
Again, it is very important to re-emphasise that the impact of the R&D shocks 
depends significantly on the baseline scenario. Specifically, under the scenario 
considered here the assumed climate change mitigation policy (a GHG tax) means 
that a number of new low-emissions technologies are already competitive. Additional 
greenhouse gas abatement only occurs when an R&D shock brings the abatement cost 
associated with the deployment of a previously uncompetitive technology to below 
the level of the GHG tax. Under the climate change policy assumed for this exercise, 
the R&D shock applied to fuel cells was the most (and possibly only) effective shock 
in terms of the indicators of climate change. Furthermore, it also had the largest 
impact on security of energy supply, being effective at extending the oil R:P ratio. 
However, although this shock results in a significant transformation of the energy 
system (as seen in Section 5.1), the impact on the climate change indicators was only 
small because of the effect of other factors. Clearly, any overall strategy to achieve 
sustainability goals through support for energy technology R&D, should include 
additional policy elements that complement and fully exploit the impact of the R&D 
policy. One possible set of complementary measures comprise support for 
demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs that attempt to accelerate technology 
adoption by focusing on the demand side. The next section explores the possible 
impact of such D&D programs, by applying orthogonal D&D shocks to the 
technologies indicated in Table 4.  
5.3 Summary of orthogonal D&D investment shocks 
In this section we present the impact of a series of demonstration and deployment 
(D&D) shocks on the same suite of indicators discussed in the preceding section. 
These deployment shocks are applied in much the same way as the R&D shocks – 
that is, independently (orthogonally) and in the base year (2000) – and, as discussed at 
the start of Section 5 the magnitude of each D&D shock is €10 billion. In this section 
we present only “impacts” calculated based on the full cost of the D&D shock, 
although it is unlikely that public expenditure would need to cover all of this cost. 
Further, although the focus here is on “impacts”, in many cases it leads naturally to a 
discussion of indicator levels (which are also reported in the Appendix in Table A3).  
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Unlike for the R&D shock exercise, we do not present a detailed example of the 
impact of a D&D shock. Instead, readers are referred to the IIASA/ECS report for the 
EC-sponsored MINIMA-SUD project (Barreto and Turton 2005), which presents in 
detail an illustrative example of the impact of a single D&D shock.  
As we emphasised in the discussion of the R&D shocks, the reader should bear in 
mind that the impacts of demonstration and deployment (D&D) shocks depend on the 
baseline scenario. The assumed baseline technology development and climate policy 
may have a large bearing on the potential impact of any D&D shock. 
5.3.1 Atmospheric CO2 and CH4 concentrations 
Unlike the R&D shocks, D&D shocks affect technology learning by forcing 
deployment of the shocked technology. This deployment not only results in additional 
experience with the technology, but creates new energy-system opportunities and 
therefore results in different impacts to the R&D shocks, which do not necessarily 
lead to technology deployment. 
This is illustrated for the impact on atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and CH4 under 
the D&D shocks as shown in Figure 22. Compared to the R&D shock impacts in 
Figure 18, the impacts in Figure 22 affect different technologies and appear to 
produce worse sustainability outcomes for atmospheric GHG concentrations. In some 
cases this is expected, such as for the impact on CO2 concentrations of the shock 
applied to advanced IGCC generation, because it accelerates the deployment and 
improves the competitiveness of a relatively more emissions-intensive technology. 
However, somewhat surprisingly, a demonstration and deployment shock applied to 
either gas combined cycle generation (GCC), biomass generation (BIP) or solar 
thermal generation also results in higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations.  
Closer examination reveals that in all three cases, the shock increases the 
competitiveness of the shocked technology leading to installation of additional 
generation capacity which helps to defer the adoption of, and ultimately lock out, 
hydrogen fuel cell electricity generation. However, over the longer term none of the 
shocked technologies is able to make a sufficiently large contribution to electricity 
generation because of constraints on resource availability (gas and biomass), and 
intermittency in the case of solar thermal generation. As a consequence, heavy 
reliance on conventional coal-fired generation continues longer than under the 
baseline scenario, resulting in higher emissions and atmospheric concentrations of 
CO2.  
Similarly, a D&D shock applied to advanced nuclear generation also locks out the use 
of fuel cells, but unlike the three technologies discussed above, nuclear generation is 
assumed to be able to make a large-scale contribution to total generation. This means 
that coal-fired generation is displaced by nuclear earlier and on a larger scale than 
with the renewables or GCC, resulting in lower GHG emissions (although they are 
still higher than under the baseline because the additional nuclear generation is unable 
to fully offset the decline in generation from fuel cells). It should briefly be mentioned 
that this result for advanced nuclear generation is different to that presented in Barreto 
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and Turton (2005) for the EC-sponsored MINIMA-SUD project mainly because of 
different technology assumptions regarding fuel cells.8  
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Figure 22: Impact of D&D shocks on atmospheric CO2 and CH4 concentrations in the 
year 2100, relative to baseline 
Note: For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 4 on page 24. Impacts are reported in a way that 
is consistent with the change in the underlying indicator, so that a negative impact means the indicator 
decreased, and a positive impact means the indicator increased. 
So far we have discussed those D&D shocks that exacerbated climate change, but 
there are a number, however, that result in abatement and lower atmospheric CO2 
concentrations. The largest reduction occurs with the shock applied to the gas fuel cell 
technology. This is not unexpected considering the importance of fuel cell generation 
over the century under the baseline scenario. This shock accelerates the deployment 
of gas fuel cells, which reduces reliance on other gas and coal-fired generation. 
However, the additional and early experience with fuel cells is not sufficient under the 
assumptions applied here to result in widespread adoption of fuel cells in 
transportation.  
An interesting result of the shock exercise is that an identical shock applied to 
stationary hydrogen fuel cell generation has almost no impact on the climate change 
indicators of interest. This result is not surprising however, if one considers that the 
deployment of hydrogen fuel cell generation cannot have any significant impact on 
the energy system because of insufficient hydrogen production and limited 
distribution infrastructure – this deployment shock results in construction of a “white 
elephant”. This highlights the importance of adopting a co-ordinated strategy when 
supporting new technologies, that accounts for upstream and downstream 
requirements for successful deployment – in this case, the D&D policy should be 
complemented by support for accelerated investment in hydrogen production and 
distribution infrastructure, and possibly carbon capture technology.  
                                               
8
 Specifically, the technology learning parameters in MINIMA-SUD reflected lower optimism 
regarding the potential effect of learning-by-doing on the cost of stationary fuel cell generation 
capacity. Consequently, this technology was not installed in significant quantities, and hence could not 
be displaced by a D&D shock. 
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Other shocks that result in a noticeable reduction in emissions are those applied to 
carbon capture technologies for post-combustion capture from conventional coal and 
gas generation. The accelerated deployment and experience with these technologies 
reduces emissions earlier in the century, but because the associated electricity 
generation technologies play a declining role later in the century, these shocks have 
only a limited impact. 
Deployment shocks applied to capture technologies that currently have no market – 
that is, carbon capture from advanced IGCC generation and from hydrogen 
production – have no impact because only very limited experience is gained. 
Similarly, shocks applied to hydrogen production technologies have essentially no 
impact because of limited hydrogen distribution infrastructure or hydrogen demand 
initially. As briefly mentioned already, this highlights the need to co-ordinate 
technology support policies so that they target all of the key elements in the energy 
chain, particularly where the deployment of each of these elements is confronted by 
significant barriers. Hydrogen-based technologies are perhaps the best examples of 
this because they are highly interdependent and all elements need to be in place before 
any of the potential benefits of a hydrogen-based energy system can be realised. The 
need for large-scale co-ordinated investment in such systems implies that there may 
be a role for government intervention, particularly in co-ordinating infrastructure 
planning and accepting some of the risk associated with interdependent capital-
intensive investment.9  
The relative impact of the D&D shocks on atmospheric concentrations of methane at 
the end of the 21st century closely resembles the impact on CO2 concentrations. This 
is somewhat surprising because shocks were applied to very different technologies 
(e.g. coal, gas, renewables, nuclear, fuel cells), which are expected to have different 
impacts on natural gas consumption. Natural gas production is the only source of 
methane emissions that differs under the shocks, since the D&D shocks are assumed 
not to change methane emissions from other activities such as agriculture. 
However, in addition to displacing hydrogen fuel cell generation, many of these 
shocks also displace natural gas generation through the first half of the century and 
hence reduce methane emissions (although in all cases the impact is very small 
compared to the total methane concentration). This is even the case for the shocks 
applied to gas combined cycle (for a short period) and fuel cell generation, which 
displace other less-efficient forms of gas consumption. However, it appears that under 
many of these shocks, most of the gas that was saved earlier in the century is 
exploited towards the end. The tendency of the shocks to shift gas consumption to 
later in the century, combined with the short atmospheric residence time of methane, 
means that the many shocks increase methane concentrations in 2100. However, for 
the shock to gas fuel cells and gas hybrids (IGH) this does not occur. The early 
deployment of gas fuel cells under this D&D shock continues to keep gas 
consumption slightly lower throughout much of the century, and even though there is 
an increase towards the end, it is relatively small. Conversely, the gas hybrid D&D 
shock works in the opposite way to the other shocks by increasing gas consumption 
earlier in the century, meaning that less gas is available towards 2100.  
                                               
9
 There may well also be an important government role in regulating what are likely to be monopoly 
hydrogen distribution assets. 
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5.3.2 Temperature 
The impact of the standardised D&D shocks on temperature change relative to the 
baseline scenario is presented in Figure 23. Looking first at the results with constant 
sulfate aerosols, the greatest temperature increase occurs with the gas combined-cycle 
D&D shock, followed by the biomass and solar thermal shocks. Because of their 
impact on locking out one of the least emissions-intensive technologies, these three 
shocks produce more climate warming than the shock applied directly to IGCC 
generation (HCA). Accordingly, these results mirror those for atmospheric CO2 
concentrations. Similarly, the D&D shocks that reduce concentrations – comprising 
the shocks to gas fuel cells and two carbon capture technologies – result in equivalent 
mitigation of temperature change. 
The impact estimates in Figure 23 that incorporate the effect of changes in aerosol 
emissions are somewhat more complicated. Perversely, those D&D shocks that lock 
out hydrogen fuel cells thereby resulting in additional generation from conventional 
coal, actually result in smaller temperature increases because of higher SOx emissions 
from coal generators. On the other hand, the shock applied to advanced coal 
generation results in both higher coal use and lower SOx emissions because IGCC 
generators are assumed to include desulfurisation units, contributing to a large 
increase in temperature. However, the D&D shock applied to the natural gas fuel cells 
also leads to this outcome, again because it displaces coal-fired generation and 
therefore reduces both CO2 and SOx emissions.  
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Figure 23: Impact of D&D shocks on global average temperature in the year 2100, 
realtive to baseline 
Note: For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 4 on page 24. Impacts are reported in a way that 
is consistent with the change in the underlying indicator, so that a negative impact means the indicator 
decreased, and a positive impact means the indicator increased. 
5.3.3 Security of supply 
The discussion so far of the impact of the D&D shocks on other sustainability 
indicators has touched on some issues related to energy security of supply. We now 
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focus on the impact on gas and oil resources-to-production ratios in more detail, to 
explore some of the possible impacts on security of D&D programs.  
Figure 24 shows that almost all of the shocks that were observed to have a significant 
impact on the other indicators of sustainability, also have an impact on security of 
energy supply. In general, these D&D shocks tend to increase global oil availability 
and decrease or leave roughly unchanged, gas availability in 2060. The impact on oil 
can be explained by the fact that these shocks facilitate additional energy production 
from technologies that do not use oil, consequently leading to lower oil consumption 
and extending the life of oil resources. The biggest impacts on long-term oil security 
occur with D&D shocks applied to advanced coal IGCC, natural gas combined-cycle, 
advanced nuclear, biomass and solar thermal generation. Smaller positive impacts 
arise with demonstration and deployment of gas fuel cells and gas hydrid vehicles. 
The impact of these shocks on natural gas resources-to-production ratios is consistent 
with the earlier discussion of these shocks, particularly in relation to methane 
emissions. In Section 5.3.1 above, we noted that many of these shocks displace gas 
consumption earlier in the century, resulting in higher gas consumption in the second 
half of the century. However, for shocks to gas combined cycle generation and gas 
hybrids, gas consumption is encouraged from earlier in the century, which results in 
the greatest impact on the R:P for gas (see Figure 24). The shocks to IGCC, gas fuel 
cells, advanced nuclear, biomass and solar thermal generation result in smaller 
impacts, and diverge depending on how advanced the shift back to gas is by 2060 in 
these scenarios. The actual pattern of gas consumption in each of these scenarios is 
quite complicated, and it is beyond the scope of this report to describe them in detail. 
However, a general note is that gas is a very attractive fuel under the assumptions 
applied here – it has a low carbon content and is flexible and convenient – so any 
D&D shock that provides a way to use more gas in place of less attractive fuels can be 
expected to be fully exploited over time. 
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Figure 24: Impact of D&D shocks on global oil and gas resource-to-production ratios in 
2060, relative to baseline 
Note: For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 4 on page 24. Impacts are reported in a way that 
is consistent with the change in the underlying indicator, so that a negative impact means the indicator 
decreased, and a positive impact means the indicator increased. 
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It should also be noted from Figure 24 that there appears to be a trade-off between the 
two indicators of global security of energy supply. That is, shocks leading to a larger 
oil R:P ratio tend to result in a smaller gas R:P ratio, meaning that as the global 
energy system weans itself away from oil, it tends to increase its reliance on natural 
gas.  
The impacts of the D&D shocks compared to those of the R&D shocks presented in 
Section 5.2 depend on a number of factors, including the stage of development each 
technology is in, and the extent to which the broader energy market is compatible for 
a specific technology – that is, whether the necessary complementary systems exist, 
particularly infrastructure, and whether there is a market for the technology output. 
The next section examines whether these two types of technology policies can be 
combined in supporting ways to create additional opportunities to realise 
sustainability objectives. 
5.4 Combined D&D and R&D investment shocks 
In our discussion of the results of orthogonal R&D and D&D shocks, we noted on a 
number of occasions that a shock may result in a limited or undesirable impact on 
sustainability because of constraints on other parts of the energy system. In some 
ways this is not surprising because a single shock cannot be expected to direct the 
development of the entire energy system onto a more sustainable path, and although it 
may address barriers to the adoption of one technology, it may in doing so raise 
barriers for other technologies.  
Some of the best examples of the potential undesirable effects of a shock were 
observed for many of the D&D shocks which displaced hydrogen fuel cell electricity 
generation, effectively locking out this technology and resulting in poorer 
sustainability outcomes. This outcome can be partly explained by constraints on the 
learning and deployment rates of the fuel cell technology – that is, this technology is 
only locked out because its learning and deployment rates restrict its ability to recover 
from the delay in learning-by-doing caused by the shock. One way to circumvent 
some of these other constraints is to target multiple parts of the energy system with 
simultaneous shocks, effectively applying a more consistent technology and policy 
strategy. In this section we present one set of simultaneous D&D and R&D shocks to 
explore the potential for well-targetted technology support to transform the energy 
system and lead to improved sustainability outcomes. These shocks are defined and 
applied exactly as outlined at the start of Section 5. 
In an attempt to identify shocks which may potentially have a greater impact on the 
sustainability indicators of interest, we selected the R&D shock with the greatest 
impact as the starting point for this analysis. This shock, applied to the fuel cell 
technology component, was observed to have the largest positive impact on a number 
of the sustainability indicators (see Section 5.2). In this analysis we then combine 
with this R&D shock each of the D&D shocks to ascertain whether the positive 
impact can be enhanced by targeting directly or indirectly related technologies. The 
effects on selected climate change and security of supply indicators are outlined 
below, again in the form of impacts. 
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5.4.1 Energy system development and atmospheric GHG 
concentrations 
The impact on atmospheric CO2 concentrations of the combined R&D and D&D 
shocks is presented in Figure 25. Again, this figure shows the impact per total shock 
expenditure – combining R&D expenditure of €7.47 billion and D&D expenditure of 
€10 billion – on this sustainability indicator. For comparison, Figure 25 also includes 
the impact of the R&D shock alone. The most noticeable result is that the impact of 
the combined shocks is generally lower than that of the independent R&D shock. 
However, it should also be noted that applying a similar-sized R&D shock to the fuel 
cell technology alone (i.e., €17.47 billion) has a lower impact per euro because of 
saturation of potential learning-by-searching (shown by the large dot in Figure 25). 
Moreover, it should be remembered that the total investment is around 130 percent 
greater under the combined shocks, and so the absolute change in the indicator is 
higher in a number of cases under the combined shock, even though the “impact” is 
lower. This is illustrated in Figure 25 where the dashed line shows what the impact 
would be if the incremental D&D shock had no effect on concentrations.10 
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Figure 25: Impact of D&D shocks combined fuel cell R&D shock on atmospheric CO2 
and CH4 concentrations in the year 2100, relative to baseline 
Note: For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 4 on page 24. Impacts are reported in a way that 
is consistent with the change in the underlying indicator, so that a negative impact means the indicator 
decreased, and a positive impact means the indicator increased. 
Figure 25 shows that the greatest impact is observed with the combined fuel cell R&D 
and advanced nuclear D&D shock. This is particularly interesting because this D&D 
shock alone resulted in an increase in CO2 concentrations of around 0.6 ppm/€bn (see 
Figure 22), whereas the combined shock results in a decrease of over 1 ppm/€bn. The 
increase in concentrations under the single shock was discussed in Section 5.3.1, and 
can be attributed to crowding out of fuel cell generation by additional advanced 
nuclear generation. By contrast, the combined shock provides sufficient support for 
                                               
10
 Interestingly, the dashed line is at roughly the same level as the large dot representing the impact 
with higher R&D expenditure. This implies that the impact of this R&D shock is already largely 
saturated.  
 40
fuel cells such that advanced nuclear does not displace and lock out hydrogen fuel cell 
generation, but instead displaces additional coal-fired generation. In addition, the 
combined fuel cell R&D shock results in the adoption and rapid penetration of fuel 
cells in transport applications, as was observed for this shock alone (Section 5.1). This 
example highlights the potential benefits of a co-ordinated strategy aimed at low-
emissions technologies, particularly for overcoming unhelpful competition between 
low-emissions sources. 
In Section 5.3, the advanced nuclear generation D&D shock was not the only one to 
displace and lock out fuel cells, leading to higher CO2 concentrations. This result was 
also seen for D&D-only shocks applied to biomass, solar thermal and gas combined 
cycle generation (which increased CO2 concentrations by more than 1.5 ppm/€bn, see 
Figure 22). However, Figure 25 shows that when combined with the fuel cell R&D 
shock, all of these D&D shocks now reduce concentrations because they no longer 
lock out hydrogen fuel cell generation. These shocks now produce an impact that is 
more intuitive, considering they provide support for low-emissions generation 
technologies. Similarly, the D&D shock applied to the advanced IGCC technology 
(HCA), although more emissions intensive than other sources, now improves 
emissions because it displaces almost entirely conventional coal generation, instead of 
fuel cells (which was the case when the D&D shock was applied independently, as 
shown in Section 5.3). Taken together, these examples highlight the importance of 
developing and implementing a co-ordinated and reinforcing (as opposed to 
competitive) technology strategy for realizing sustainability objectives. 
Interestingly, combining the fuel cell R&D shock with a D&D shock targeted at 
directly related technologies such as gas or hydrogen fuel cell generation (GFC, HEF) 
has no additional impact, or results in a relative worsening (increase) in atmospheric 
concentrations in the case of the D&D shock to hydrogen fuel cell generation. These 
results can be explained by appreciating the interplay between different fuel cell 
technologies, and the limited availability of hydrogen.  
Looking first at the gas fuel cell generation technology, a D&D shock reinforces the 
impact of the R&D shock on the competitiveness of fuel cell electricity generation. 
This results in much greater output from fuel cell generators (than under the R&D 
shock alone). Moreover, the D&D shock also provides a slight competitive edge to 
stationary fuel cells over mobile fuel cells, which is sufficient to render more 
attractive the use of hydrogen in stationary generation rather than transport. As an 
overall consequence, the impact on atmospheric CO2 concentrations from a greater 
share of electricity generation from low-emissions fuel cells (compared to under the 
R&D shock alone) is offset by the failure of fuel cells to penetrate significantly the 
transport market. 
In the case of the hydrogen fuel cell (HEF) D&D shock, although it provides some 
learning-by-doing benefits initially, its impact on the energy system is small because 
of the very limited availability of hydrogen production and distribution infrastructure 
early in the century. However, the one impact of this combined shock is to provide 
enough competition for the small quantities of hydrogen that are available early in the 
century to stifle the emergence of a fuel cell powered transportation sector. As a 
consequence, this D&D shock results in almost no additional fuel cell generation 
compared to the baseline scenario, and no deployment of fuel cells in transportation. 
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That is, it undermines the positive effects of the R&D shock on CO2 concentrations, 
even though both shocks support very similar technologies.  
A similar result is observed when the fuel cell R&D shock is combined with D&D 
shocks to any of the fuel cell transportation technologies (PFC, AFC and HFC). These 
technologies are very expensive at the time the D&D shock is applied, so deployment 
cannot establish the necessary critical mass to support the early emergence of a fuel 
cell-based transport system. However, these shocks provide some learning-by-doing 
experience with fuel cells, which is sufficient for the stationary technologies to gain a 
relative competitive advantage to mobile fuel cell applications. To put this another 
way, a little support is required to make mobile fuel cells competitive with other 
transport technologies, but too much D&D support at the “wrong” time appears to 
make the use of hydrogen in stationary fuel cells more attractive. Because there is 
more potential demand for hydrogen than there is supply, the less competitive 
applications (in transport) are displaced by alternative technologies – in this case, by 
hybrids and alcohol fuels. This result may be reinforced by the requirement for 
possible additional hydrogen distribution requirements for mobile fuel cell 
applications. In Figure 25, we see that there is almost no impact on atmospheric CO2 
concentrations relative to the baseline scenario. It is important to emphasise that this 
appears to be quite a complex result, with a number of reinforcing and countervailing 
forces operating simultaneously, so these results can only provide an initial guide as 
to the possible consequences of this combination of technology support policies. 
The only other significant results in Figure 25 relate to the demonstration and 
deployment shocks applied to post-combustion carbon capture from coal and gas 
electricity generation (HCCCS, GCCCS). In the case of both of these technologies, 
the impact of the combined R&D-D&D shock appears to be roughly equal to 
weighted average of the separate impacts. This implies that these shocks are largely 
independent, even though we have seen that the fuel cell R&D shock displaces some 
coal-fired electricity generation. 
5.4.2 Global temperature change 
The impact on temperature change of the combined R&D and D&D shocks is 
presented in Figure 26. Once again, when the effect of the shock on emissions of 
oxides of sulfur (SOx) is excluded, the impact on temperature closely mirrors the 
impact on atmospheric CO2 concentrations, which is not surprising. However, a more 
complex picture emerges when the overall impact on temperature is examined. 
Figure 26 shows that the R&D shock alone has close to the worst impact on global 
average temperature in 2100, under the assumptions applied here. However, as 
discussed above, this result is largely due to the fact that total expenditure on R&D 
and D&D is 130 percent larger under the combined shock than for the R&D-only 
shock, and SOx emissions do not change by anywhere near as much. In Figure 26 we 
also show what happens to the impact of the R&D shock if we simply assume a larger 
expenditure, illustrated by the dashed line with squares. Comparing this with the 
reported impacts for the combined shocks shows that in many cases the additional 
D&D expenditure makes only a very small change to the actual temperature. This is 
partly because many shocks have little additional impact, as was seen for emissions in 
Figure 25, but is also partly explained by the aversion to coal under the assumptions 
applied here, particularly the climate policy. This aversion means that any shock will 
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tend to reduce coal consumption (especially using conventional technologies), 
reducing CO2 and, in many cases, SOx as well, which tends to balance the impact on 
radiative forcing and temperature change. 
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Figure 26: Impact of D&D shocks combined fuel cell R&D shock on global average 
temperature in the year 2100, realtive to baseline 
Note: For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 4 on page 24. Impacts are reported in a way that 
is consistent with the change in the underlying indicator, so that a negative impact means the indicator 
decreased, and a positive impact means the indicator increased. 
One important exception, of course, is the D&D shock to IGCC coal generation, 
which supports coal consumption while at the same time significantly reducing SO2. 
However, the D&D shock to IGCC (HCA), in combination with the R&D shock to 
fuel cells, is far more effective at displacing conventional coal than either shock 
alone. As a consequence, CO2 emissions and forcing are lower but SOx emissions are 
much lower, and this manifests as a higher average global temperature in Figure 26.  
It is interesting to contrast this result with some of the other technology shocks that 
result in a relative reduction in global temperature. Looking at both indicators of 
temperature change (with and without changes in sulfate forcing), the D&D shock 
applied to the gas combined cycle carbon capture technology is the only one to 
improve both, which also occurred when this D&D shock was applied without the gas 
fuel cell R&D shock. However, the impact on constant-sulfate temperature is about 
the same under this combination of shocks as it is for the IGCC-fuel cell combination 
discussed in the previous paragraph, even though the latter results in the highest 
temperature when SOx emissions are considered. The choice of which is the most 
appropriate indicator to target has been discussed in previous sections, and the 
consequences of this choice is starkly illustrated by the choice between these two 
technology support combinations.  
Importantly, however, there are other shock combinations which have an even greater 
impact on temperature with constant sulfate, such as the combined fuel cell R&D and 
advanced nuclear D&D shock. This shock also results in a relative improvement in 
the impact on global temperature when changes in SOx emissions are also considered. 
Other combined shocks that improve both indicators relative to the single R&D shock 
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are those targeted at gas combined cycle (GCC), solar thermal (STH) and biomass 
(BIP) generation, and carbon capture from conventional coal generation (HCCCS). 
Most of the other combined technology shocks behave similarly to the D&D-alone 
shocks, although starting from a different baseline. 
5.4.3 Security of energy supply  
We now turn to the impacts on indicators of security of energy supply. As mentioned 
earlier in this report, the resources-to-production ratio used as an indicator of energy 
security differs from the conventional reserves-to-production ratio (BP 2004) in that it 
is a long-term indicator of sustainable resources use which can only be influenced 
through changes in consumption, unlike the reserves-to-production ratio which can be 
increased by identifying and reclassifying resources.  
Under the shocks examined here, impacts on the resources-to-production ratio for oil 
in the year 2060 are in almost all cases positive or zero, as shown in Figure 27. 
However, this is not surprising considering that the R&D shock alone elicits the same 
or a stronger response, as do many of the D&D-only shocks (Sections 5.1 and 5.3.3). 
In almost all cases these shocks are able to displace oil consumption largely by 
increasing gas consumption. As briefly mentioned earlier, under the assumptions used 
in these scenarios gas is a very attractive fuel. Accordingly, the additional pathways 
created by the shocks that allow the efficient use of gas to displace less attractive fuels 
such as coal are exploited. Consequently, as shown in Figure 27, this means that the 
incremental effect on the indicator of all but five of the D&D shocks on gas security is 
negative (refer to the dotted line in Figure 27 indicating the level of the R&D-only 
shock after adjusting for the additional cost of the D&D shocks).  
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Figure 27: Impact of D&D shocks combined fuel cell R&D shock on global oil and gas 
resource-to-production ratios in 2060, relative to baseline 
Note: For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 4 on page 24. Impacts are reported in a way that 
is consistent with the change in the underlying indicator, so that a negative impact means the indicator 
decreased, and a positive impact means the indicator increased. 
The five combined D&D shocks that improve gas security (while worsening oil 
security) relative to the R&D-only shock have been discussed earlier in Section 5.3.3, 
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and comprise entirely shocks targeted at the fuel-cell technologies (GFC, HEF, PFC, 
AFC, HFC). The impact of these shocks is small because they ultimately support 
stationary hydrogen fuel cell generation, but are unable to stimulate additional 
hydrogen production, and so these technology support scenarios do not diverge 
substantially from the baseline scenario (with the exception of the shock to stationary 
gas fuel cell generation which supports additional deployment of this technology, 
relative to the baseline).  
Since all other combined shocks worsen gas security relative to the R&D-only shock, 
we can only attempt to identify those technology support combinations that have the 
smallest additional negative effect while maximizing oil security. Of course, the 
relative importance of these sustainability indicators should determine the weighting 
applied to maintaining the lifetime of either resource. However, it should be noted 
that the oil R:P ratio is generally lower than the gas R:P (see Section 3.2.3) under the 
assumptions applied here, so declines in the oil ratio may be more likely to lead to the 
emergence of more extreme vulnerabilities to supply disruption. However, the fact 
that gas is an increasingly important fuel for a large part of the 21st century under 
these scenarios, may mean that decreasing supply security of this resource will have 
larger and more extensive consequences. 
Looking at Figure 27, the combined shocks that result in the best outcomes for oil 
security are those targeted at electricity generation from IGCC coal (HCA), gas 
combined cycle turbines (GCC), biomass, solar thermal, wind and nuclear sources, 
and gas hybrid vehicles (IGH). However, the shocks targeted at gas combined cycle 
generation and hybrids results in a significant worsening of gas security, which is not 
unexpected considering these are gas-based technologies, and should only be pursued 
if the impact on gas security of supply is considered to be managable. Of the 
remaining technologies, the renewable forms of generation (BIP, STH, WND) appear 
to perform well on both indicators, with biomass generation having the largest impact 
on the oil R:P. 
6 Discussion, conclusions and summary 
This report has examined the long-term impact on indicators of sustainable 
development of a number of technology support policies. The measures of sustainable 
development of interest include indicators of climate change – including atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases, temperature change and sea-level rise – and 
measures of security of energy supply for oil and gas. The technology support policies 
investigated in this analysis include investment in energy research and development 
(R&D) and demonstration and deployment (D&D). 
The analysis was conducted using the modeling framework developed at IIASA-ECS 
for the SAPIENTIA project, as described in Turton and Barreto (2003), and updated 
to incorporate additional material from other SAPIENTIA partners (including 
Kouvaritakis and Panos 2005). The main elements of this framework comprise the 
“bottom-up” energy-systems ERIS model and the climate model MAGICC. The ERIS 
model incorporates technological learning and spillovers, and extensive energy and 
non-energy GHG abatement opportunities. 
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Importantly, the impact of technology support policies and measures using this 
framework is strongly influenced by assumptions about the baseline development of 
the energy system, and policy environment. A number of critical elements in the 
baseline scenario must be considered when interpreting the results of this analysis. 
These include a climate change policy, which itself encourages the adoption of a 
number of technologies with a positive impact on the sustainability indicators of 
interest. Other important features include the assumed levels of resources, limits on 
the deployment rates of new technologies, and assumptions about R&D expenditure 
and energy demand.11 In many cases, these critical assumptions may be expected to 
have more influence on the development of the energy system than specific 
technology policies. Conversely, changing these assumptions, such as by 
incorporating a more stringent climate policy, will redirect the development of the 
energy system, and may result in other technologies becoming more important, and 
thus possible targets for support. 
In the baseline scenario used in this analysis, the main energy system developments 
over the century include a transition to natural gas-based electricity generation prior to 
a strong shift to nuclear and renewable forms of electricity generation. In addition, 
fuel cells play an increasingly important role in electricity generation in this baseline 
scenario and are among the fastest growing technologies at the end of the century. 
Consequently, hydrogen becomes an important energy carrier, although other fuels 
remain important. In transportation, hybrid engines, natural gas and alcohol fuels all 
play an important role (although fuel cells do not). Greenhouse gas emissions peak in 
2070, and atmospheric CO2 concentrations rise to 700 ppm by 2100 (and are still 
increasing) under this scenario. 
To examine the potential significance and impact of additional support for energy 
R&D under this baseline scenario, we analysed the impact of optimistic and 
pessimistic future scenarios of government R&D investment. The optimistic scenario 
– involving a doubling above business-as-usual of government energy R&D until 
2050 – resulted in a transformation of some key elements of the energy system, 
illustrating the potential impact of technology support policies. Specifically, this 
optimistic scenario provided sufficient support to fuel cells and related technologies to 
lead to deployment of, and eventual domination of the transport sector by fuel cell 
vehicles (instead of hybrids). Furthermore, this optimistic R&D scenario also changed 
the electricity sector, although less significantly, by facilitating additional generation 
from gas combined cycle generation and a shift from hydrogen fuel cells to gas fuel 
cells (given that much of the available hydrogen was now consumed in the transport 
sector). This resulted in a displacement of coal-fired electricity generation, lower 
GHG emissions and improved outcomes on a number of sustainability indicators. 
In contrast, the pessimistic R&D scenario (with zero government energy R&D) 
resulted in relatively little change in the energy system compared to the baseline 
scenario. This appears to raise two conflicting conclusions – firstly, that under the 
assumptions here government R&D support can have a significant and far-reaching 
impact on energy system development (optimistic scenario), while other factors 
influencing the development of the energy system, including the climate policy and 
                                               
11
 Assumptions about the application of other related technologies and policies, such as those aimed at 
reducing sulfate emissions from combustion, may also have an important bearing on the results. This 
particular example is discussed later in this section. 
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resource constraints, may have a much larger influence than public energy R&D 
support (pessimistic scenario). These apparently contradictory results imply that for 
government R&D support to be effective it needs to be compatible with the broader 
policy, technology and resource environment. Moreover, even taking the results of the 
pessimistic scenario at face value does not necessarily imply that there is no place for 
government energy R&D, since even though such policies may have only a small 
influence on the direction of energy system development, they can still have an 
important influence on cost.  
The idea that R&D support needs to be compatible with other constraints on the 
energy system and policy variables was explored by targeting support to key 
technologies in the form of R&D investment “shocks”. This exercise reinforced the 
conclusion that there are only limited opportunities for public R&D support to be 
effective in transforming the development of the global energy system, and this 
support needs to be compatible with other factors directing development. Specifically, 
almost all of the technology-specific R&D shocks had almost no effect on the 
development of the energy system – which is consistent with the result observed 
under the pessimistic R&D scenario. However, the most significant exception was 
R&D support for the generic fuel cell technology used in both stationary and mobile 
applications. This shock was sufficient to shift the development of the energy system 
as a whole onto a path very similar to that under the optimistic R&D scenario, but for 
a fraction of the cost, indicating that a single well-targetted technology support 
program can substantially change the development path followed by the global energy 
system.  
In many ways it is not surprising that very few shocks were observed to have a 
significant impact on energy system development. This can be understood if one 
remembers that this scenario assumes a climate change policy, so alternative 
technology options can be thought of as different greenhouse gas abatement 
opportunities with different costs. The climate policy is modeled as a GHG tax, and 
all of the technology options with an abatement cost of below the tax rate are 
exploited under the baseline scenario. Accordingly, under the assumptions applied 
here an R&D shock (or support program) can only change the technology 
development path if it shifts the cost of an abatement opportunity from above to 
below the GHG tax rate. This is affected by technology characteristics, but within the 
mix of technologies examined here, it is not surprising that this occurred infrequently. 
For technology options that were already attractive, the R&D shocks only help to 
reduce overall energy system costs – that is, there is still a return on R&D investment, 
despite this investment having little or no impact on the indicators of sustainable 
development. On the other hand, R&D shocks targeted at technologies that are 
unattractive, and remain unattractive after the shock, have effectively no impact, but 
may represent an important part of a hedging strategy against uncertainty regarding 
the necessary stringency of future climate change mitigation targets.  
This again highlights the importance of the baseline scenario assumptions. Were we 
to assume a less or more stringent climate change policy, this would change the suite 
of technologies that are competitive under the baseline scenario, and move the critical 
threshold that determines whether an R&D shock has any significant effect on the 
energy system. This further reinforces the notion that technology policy needs to be 
designed and implemented in a way that complements and enhances the existing 
 47
policy environment. As mentioned, uncertainty regarding the potential policy 
environment warrants an effective technology policy hedging strategy, in which a 
suite of technologies are targeted initially, and as policy uncertainty is resolved 
technology support programs become increasingly focused. 
One element of such a comprehensive and complementary technology policy may 
require combining technology-push with market-pull, to accelerate technology 
deployment and realise positive impacts on sustainability indicators. The role of 
technology demonstration and deployment (D&D) policies in achieving sustainable 
development objectives was also explored in this analysis. These D&D technology 
policies – again applied in the form of a “shock” in the base year – were examined 
both separately and in combination with R&D policies. 
When pursued separately, some D&D investment policies were observed to have the 
potential to improve a number of indicators of sustainability. However, under the 
assumptions and baseline scenario used here, in many cases these D&D shocks 
“crowded out” other technologies, resulting in poorer sustainability outcomes. 
Specifically, most of the D&D shocks applied to electricity generation technologies 
resulted in one of the most successful low-emissions technologies in the baseline 
scenario – fuel cell electricity generation – missing a critical window of opportunity. 
The high level of support provided to other technologies by the D&D shock 
effectively lock out a nascent fuel cell generation industry, which is unable to 
penetrate the market later in the century because critical learning opportunities have 
been missed. The alternative technologies receiving the D&D support, including zero 
emissions technologies such as nuclear and renewable generation, make an initially 
positive contribution to some of the sustainability indicators, but are ultimately 
limited by technical and/or resource constraints, leading to a longer and larger 
reliance on less-sustainable technologies. This illustrates a significant danger 
associated with supporting certain technologies without considering the potential 
limitations they may face and the possible lock-out over the longer term of more 
promising technologies. Accordingly, support programs for technologies need to be 
pursued in a way that is complementary rather than competitive to the development of 
other technologies likely to contribute to the achievement of sustainability objectives. 
Combining R&D and D&D may be one effective way of pursuing a complementary 
technology support strategy. This analysis demonstrated that technology lock-out of 
fuel cell generation could be avoided if R&D support was provided to fuel cells while 
D&D support provided to other technologies. This more integrated technology policy 
addressed multiple barriers to technology adoption in a way that was reinforcing and 
complementary. Consequently, the largest improvements in a number of sustainability 
indicators were observed under combined policies and, more importantly, high 
impacts (per euro) were also maintained. The most effective combined shock explored 
in this analysis on a number of sustainability indicators comprised R&D support for 
fuel cells and deployment support for advanced nuclear generation. These together 
accelerated the deployment of a zero-emissions and potentially large-scale generation 
technology (advanced nuclear), while supporting the critical early development stages 
for fuel cell technologies, allowing them to make a large contribution in the future 
energy system in both electricity generation and transport. Demonstration and 
deployment shocks targeted at other low-emissions technologies also resulted in 
incremental improvements in sustainability indicators when combined with the R&D 
 48
shock. Not surprisingly, this shows that technology policies can be most effective at 
realizing sustainability objectives when they combine complementary and reinforcing 
elements. 
This is particularly relevant to the hydrogen-related technologies examined in this 
analysis, where D&D or R&D shocks targeted at individual hydrogen production or 
consumption technologies had relative little impact. Apart from the need to address 
barriers specific to each technology, these results illustrate the requirement for all 
elements of a hydrogen-based energy system to be in place before potential benefits 
can be fully realised. Accordingly, considering the need for co-ordination, large-scale 
investment and the potential risks associated with developing the infrastructure 
required across the hydrogen energy chain, there is potentially a very significant role 
for government support and deployment programs.  
Importantly, however, many of the results of this analysis imply that the relative 
importance given to different sustainability objectives may have a bearing on the 
choice of targets for technology support. For instance, in many cases the R&D and 
D&D programs examined here supported technologies that were able to displace coal-
based energy systems, thereby reducing both CO2 and SOx emissions. As a 
consequence although many of these technology policies reduced atmospheric GHG 
emissions, they resulted in a small increase in temperature because the negative 
radiative forcing from sulfate aerosols was reduced. This potentially leads to the 
perverse conclusion that climate change indicators can be improved by maximising 
SOx emissions (probably by supporting coal-based technologies). However, taking a 
long-term perspective it may be reasonable to assume that SOx-reduction policies will 
be implemented as part of the pursuit of other environmental goals, and so lower 
weighting should be attached to the effect of sulfate aerosols on temperature change 
in the pursuit of long-term climate change mitigation. 
Another area where a potential trade-off may occur is pursuit of both climate change 
mitigation and maintenance of security of energy supply. Again, however, this 
depends on the relative importance given to different indicators. As discussed in 
Section 5.4.3, oil is globally less abundant than natural gas, so the fact that many of 
the D&D and R&D shocks that produced positive climate change impacts also 
improved oil security at the expense of gas security of supply may be considered a 
reasonable trade-off. However, because gas becomes an increasingly important fuel 
for a large part of the 21st century under these scenarios, it may be more important to 
protect the longevity of this resource, since any supply disruption may have larger and 
more extensive consequences. Appreciating such potential synergies (such as between 
climate change mitigation and oil security) and trade-offs (such as gas security) are 
important for designing an appropriate integrated technology policy strategy (see 
Turton and Barreto 2005). 
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8 Appendix 
Table A1. Impact of technology learning on capital costs, pessimistic R&D scenario         
Group Technology Abbreviations 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
      €99/kW           
Conventional Coal  HCC 1,219 1,214 1,161 1,121 1,077 1,045 1,018 995 974 958 947 
Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) HCA 1,436 1,404 1,380 1,353 1,324 1,286 1,253 1,244 1,236 1,228 1,222 
Oil Conventional Thermal OLC 1,108 1,070 1,057 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 
Gas Turbine Combined Cycle GCC 548 536 524 517 513 510 508 508 508 507 507 
Gas Conventional Thermal GSC 986 943 922 904 895 892 890 890 890 890 890 
Gas Turbine Open Cycle GTR 384 374 358 346 338 332 328 327 326 325 325 
Gas Fuel Cell (generic stationary) GFC 11,755 6,479 3,510 1,384 589 413 294 233 205 181 164 
Nuclear (2nd and 3rd gen.) NUC 2,765 2,671 2,334 2,073 1,906 1,840 1,790 1,771 1,759 1,746 1,737 
New Nuclear (4th gen.) NNU 8,555 8,416 8,256 8,092 7,017 6,051 5,205 4,457 3,829 3,284 2,833 
Biomass BIP 2,477 2,108 2,037 1,988 1,942 1,901 1,868 1,868 1,868 1,868 1,868 
Large Hydro HYD 3,227 3,144 3,065 2,932 2,748 2,526 2,383 2,312 2,287 2,270 2,251 
Solar Thermal Power Plant Cylindro-Parabolic STH 3,111 3,015 2,893 2,751 2,597 2,448 2,311 2,300 2,289 2,279 2,276 
Building Integrated PV SPV 6,385 4,933 4,193 3,511 2,951 2,288 1,958 1,883 1,879 1,878 1,869 
Wind Turbines WND 1,061 986 920 853 802 768 743 738 735 733 731 
Electricity 
generation 
technologies 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell (generic stationary) HEF 11,755 6,479 3,510 1,384 589 413 294 233 205 181 164 
  
  
  €99/m3d                     
Hydrogen from Gas Steam Reforming (large scale) GASH2NE 46 45 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Hydrogen from Coal Partial Oxidation COALH2NE 117 112 107 102 96 90 85 84 83 81 80 
Hydrogen 
production 
technologies Hydrogen from Biomass Pyrolysis BIOH2NE 122 116 106 99 95 90 86 85 83 81 79 
  
  
  €99/vehicle                   
Conventional ICE Passenger Car  ICC/ICG/ICA 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
Hybrid Passenger Car ICH/IGH/IAH 7,700 6,083 5,599 5,255 5,019 4,970 4,931 4,912 4,900 4,891 4,884 
Hydrogen ICE-Hybrid Passenger Car IHH 11,000 9,383 8,899 8,555 8,319 8,270 7,606 7,565 7,543 7,530 7,513 
Reformer-Fuel Cell Passenger Car PFC/AFC 590,200 379,150 260,418 175,360 143,574 136,528 131,760 129,304 128,208 127,243 126,541 
Passenger 
car 
technologies 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell Passenger Car HFC 472,600 261,550 142,818 57,760 25,974 18,928 13,705 11,233 10,130 9,162 8,453 
  
  
  €99/toe input per year                 
Pre-Combustion CO2 capture (IGCC) HCACS 31 31 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Post-Combustion CO2 capture (Conventional Coal) HCCCS 52 52 24 22 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Post-Combustion CO2 capture (GCC) GCCCS 31 31 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
    €99/m3d                     
Carbon 
capture 
technologies 
Pre-Combustion CO2 capture (Hydrogen Production) H2CAS 68 68 68 68 67 66 65 64 63 62 61 
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Table A2. Impact of technology learning on capital costs, optimistic R&D scenario 
Group Technology Abbreviations 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
      €99/kW           
Conventional Coal  HCC 1,219 1,214 1,161 1,121 1,077 1,044 1,017 994 974 958 950 
Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) HCA 1,436 1,349 1,300 1,251 1,208 1,163 1,127 1,121 1,116 1,110 1,106 
Oil Conventional Thermal OLC 1,108 1,069 1,056 1,054 1,053 1,052 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 
Gas Turbine Combined Cycle GCC 548 535 523 516 512 509 507 507 506 506 506 
Gas Conventional Thermal GSC 986 941 919 900 889 883 879 879 879 879 879 
Gas Turbine Open Cycle GTR 384 373 357 344 336 330 326 325 324 323 323 
Gas Fuel Cell (generic stationary) GFC 11,755 5,234 695 152 89 57 50 50 50 50 50 
Nuclear (2nd and 3rd gen.) NUC 2,765 2,436 2,058 1,869 1,791 1,763 1,742 1,733 1,727 1,720 1,715 
New Nuclear (4th gen.) NNU 8,555 6,693 5,573 4,648 3,483 2,643 2,029 1,742 1,502 1,299 1,296 
Biomass BIP 2,477 2,056 1,979 1,926 1,880 1,843 1,814 1,814 1,814 1,814 1,814 
Large Hydro HYD 3,227 3,143 3,063 2,929 2,747 2,524 2,382 2,312 2,285 2,269 2,250 
Solar Thermal Power Plant Cylindro-Parabolic STH 3,111 2,784 2,523 2,298 2,119 1,983 1,877 1,871 1,865 1,860 1,858 
Building Integrated PV SPV 6,385 4,346 3,400 2,705 2,263 1,906 1,728 1,696 1,689 1,686 1,683 
Wind Turbines WND 1,061 932 850 786 744 719 701 698 696 695 694 
Electricity 
generation 
technologies 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell (generic stationary) HEF 11,755 5,234 695 152 89 57 50 50 50 50 50 
  
  
  €99/m3d                     
Hydrogen from Gas Steam Reforming (large scale) GASH2NE 46 45 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Hydrogen from Coal Partial Oxidation COALH2NE 117 107 101 95 90 84 79 78 77 76 75 
Hydrogen 
production 
technologies Hydrogen from Biomass Pyrolysis BIOH2NE 122 113 103 97 93 88 85 83 81 79 78 
  
  
  €99/vehicle                   
Conventional ICE Passenger Car  ICC/ICG/ICA 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
Hybrid Passenger Car ICH/IGH/IAH 7,700 5,685 5,295 5,053 4,993 4,946 4,909 4,896 4,890 4,887 4,886 
Hydrogen ICE-Hybrid Passenger Car IHH 11,000 8,985 8,595 7,671 7,528 7,418 7,321 7,255 7,217 7,191 7,173 
Reformer-Fuel Cell Passenger Car PFC/AFC 590,200 329,345 147,784 126,084 123,567 122,293 122,000 122,000 122,000 122,000 122,000 
Passenger 
car 
technologies 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell Passenger Car HFC 472,600 211,745 30,184 7,988 5,411 4,091 3,754 3,716 3,692 3,675 3,663 
  
  
  €99/toe input per year                 
Pre-Combustion CO2 capture (IGCC) HCACS 31 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Post-Combustion CO2 capture (Conventional Coal) HCCCS 52 25 23 21 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Post-Combustion CO2 capture (GCC) GCCCS 31 24 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
  
  €99/m3d                     
Carbon 
capture 
technologies 
Pre-Combustion CO2 capture (Hydrogen Production) H2CAS 68 68 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
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Table A3. Sustainability indicator levels under all technology policies 
Technology policy Policy cost Indicators 
  Climate change indicators  Security of supply indicators 
  
Atmospheric CO2 
concentration 
Atmospheric CH4 
concentration 
Temperature 
change 
Temperature change 
(constant sulfate) 
Sea-level 
rise  
Oil R:P 
(global) 
Oil R:C 
(Europe) 
Gas R:P 
(global) 
Gas R:C 
(Europe) 
 €bn (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100)  (2060) (2060) (2060) (2060) 
  (undiscounted) (ppmv) (ppbv) (K) (K) (cm)   (years) (years) (years) (years) 
Baseline 0 701.93 2538.5 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.56 11.15 45.17 33.35 
Optimistic R&D 425,368 693.34 2531.3 3.270 2.702 41   34.39 11.74 44.38 31.09 
Pessimistic R&D -425,368 702.79 2537.8 3.242 2.729 40.8  32.58 11.15 44.96 33.04 
Standardised R&D shocks                     
HYD 4.48 701.8 2538.4 3.238 2.726 40.8  32.50 11.15 45.13 33.07 
NUC 22.49 701.86 2538.6 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.52 11.13 45.15 33.01 
NNU 6.98 701.98 2538.3 3.239 2.726 40.8   32.47 11.20 45.14 33.03 
HCC 9.70 701.74 2538.5 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.54 11.13 45.17 33.17 
HCCCS 0.007 701.71 2538.3 3.238 2.726 40.8  32.50 11.13 45.11 33.05 
HCA 3.18 701.94 2538.5 3.239 2.726 40.8   32.57 11.15 45.18 33.36 
HCACS 0.003 701.93 2538.5 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.56 11.15 45.17 33.35 
OLC 9.25 701.85 2538.5 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.52 11.13 45.17 33.59 
GCC 12.36 701.94 2538.4 3.239 2.726 40.8   32.56 11.15 45.16 33.35 
GSC 6.05 701.89 2538.1 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.66 11.13 45.06 33.65 
GTR 12.36 701.96 2538.4 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.54 11.15 45.14 33.28 
GCCCS 0.003 701.71 2538.3 3.238 2.726 40.8   32.50 11.13 45.11 33.05 
WND 2.15 701.71 2538.3 3.238 2.726 40.8  32.50 11.13 45.11 33.05 
STH 1.07 701.42 2538.3 3.240 2.725 40.8  32.47 11.15 45.17 33.68 
SPV 9.94 701.76 2538.4 3.239 2.726 40.8   32.56 11.13 45.16 33.52 
BIP 4.46 701.88 2538.4 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.49 11.22 45.15 33.40 
FCMS 7.47 694.61 2531.6 3.271 2.706 41  33.74 11.04 44.35 31.25 
GASH2NE 0.93 701.79 2538.3 3.239 2.726 40.8   32.57 11.13 45.16 33.64 
H2CAS 0.000 701.93 2538.5 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.56 11.15 45.17 33.35 
COALH2NE 0.37 701.96 2538.4 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.49 11.15 45.12 33.07 
BIOH2NE 0.044 701.74 2538.5 3.239 2.726 40.8   32.54 11.13 45.17 33.17 
ICH 0.81 701.93 2538.5 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.56 11.15 45.17 33.35 
ELVT 0.81 701.7 2538.3 3.238 2.726 40.8  32.51 11.13 45.12 33.05 
HYBB 0.81 701.94 2538.6 3.239 2.726 40.8   32.61 11.13 45.16 33.64 
Non-standard R&D shocks                     
HCCCS 1.00 701.71 2538.3 3.238 2.726 40.8  32.50 11.13 45.11 33.05 
HCACS 1.00 701.93 2538.5 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.56 11.15 45.17 33.35 
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Technology policy Policy cost Indicators 
  Climate change indicators  Security of supply indicators 
  
Atmospheric CO2 
concentration 
Atmospheric CH4 
concentration 
Temperature 
change 
Temperature change 
(constant sulfate) 
Sea-level 
rise  
Oil R:P 
(global) 
Oil R:C 
(Europe) 
Gas R:P 
(global) 
Gas R:C 
(Europe) 
 €bn (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100)  (2060) (2060) (2060) (2060) 
  (undiscounted) (ppmv) (ppbv) (K) (K) (cm)   (years) (years) (years) (years) 
GCCCS 1.00 701.74 2538 3.238 2.726 40.8   32.53 11.13 45.16 33.64 
H2CAS 1.00 701.94 2538.4 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.62 11.13 45.14 33.65 
BIOH2NE 1.00 701.92 2538.6 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.61 11.13 45.16 33.64 
COALH2NE 1.00 701.68 2538.1 3.238 2.726 40.8   32.64 11.13 45.17 33.65 
FCMS 17.47 693.81 2532.2 3.272 2.704 41  34.14 11.56 44.17 31.17 
Standardised D&D shocks                     
HCA 10 714.25 2543.9 3.280 2.758 41.3  34.79 11.95 44.77 29.66 
GCC 10 718.05 2541.5 3.104 2.770 40.4  34.96 11.95 44.02 29.73 
GTR 10 701.61 2538 3.238 2.725 40.8   32.60 11.13 45.12 33.66 
GFC 10 694.97 2536.7 3.260 2.704 40.9  33.40 11.12 44.85 33.68 
NNU 10 708.14 2540.4 3.193 2.747 40.7  34.17 12.08 44.88 29.48 
BIP 10 717.27 2546 3.116 2.768 40.4   35.01 12.04 45.45 29.81 
STH 10 716.89 2546.1 3.109 2.767 40.4  34.64 11.96 45.28 29.90 
SPV 10 701.35 2538.3 3.240 2.725 40.8  32.51 11.15 45.16 33.69 
WND 10 701.09 2538.2 3.236 2.723 40.8   32.88 11.15 45.17 33.69 
HEF 10 701.98 2538.3 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.47 11.20 45.13 32.97 
GASH2NE 10 701.76 2538.3 3.238 2.726 40.8  32.50 11.13 45.17 33.70 
COALH2NE 10 701.9 2538.2 3.239 2.726 40.8   32.50 11.22 45.14 33.03 
BIOH2NE 10 701.83 2538.1 3.238 2.726 40.8  32.60 11.15 45.18 33.69 
ICH 10 701.86 2538.4 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.56 11.13 45.14 33.60 
IGH 10 702.13 2533.2 3.230 2.726 40.8   33.74 11.18 44.22 33.65 
IAH 10 701.77 2538.4 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.53 11.13 45.15 33.19 
IHH 10 701.77 2538.4 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.56 11.13 45.17 33.65 
PFC 10 701.66 2538.2 3.238 2.725 40.8   32.58 11.13 45.15 33.65 
AFC 10 701.66 2538.2 3.238 2.725 40.8  32.58 11.13 45.15 33.65 
HFC 10 701.89 2538.5 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.61 11.13 45.16 33.66 
HCACS 10 701.01 2538.3 3.237 2.724 40.8   32.47 11.00 45.14 33.08 
HCCCS 10 699.18 2538.6 3.222 2.717 40.7  32.57 11.13 45.18 33.92 
GCCCS 10 698.9 2538.4 3.230 2.715 40.7  32.52 11.45 44.81 28.72 
H2CAS 10 701.65 2538.1 3.238 2.725 40.8   32.64 11.13 45.17 33.65 
Combined R&D FCMS and standardised D&D shocks                   
FCHCA 17.47 691.09 2526.8 3.338 2.691 41.7  34.93 11.69 43.83 30.84 
 55
Technology policy Policy cost Indicators 
  Climate change indicators  Security of supply indicators 
  
Atmospheric CO2 
concentration 
Atmospheric CH4 
concentration 
Temperature 
change 
Temperature change 
(constant sulfate) 
Sea-level 
rise  
Oil R:P 
(global) 
Oil R:C 
(Europe) 
Gas R:P 
(global) 
Gas R:C 
(Europe) 
 €bn (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100)  (2060) (2060) (2060) (2060) 
  (undiscounted) (ppmv) (ppbv) (K) (K) (cm)   (years) (years) (years) (years) 
FCGCC 17.47 690.49 2522.9 3.270 2.688 41.2  34.69 11.66 43.02 32.09 
FCGTR 17.47 694.61 2529.5 3.261 2.705 41   34.15 11.75 43.99 31.67 
FCGFC 17.47 694.76 2536.5 3.275 2.704 41  33.33 11.15 44.91 33.69 
FCNNU 17.47 683.62 2522 3.265 2.674 41.1  34.37 11.70 43.78 31.08 
FCBIP 17.47 691.6 2530.3 3.266 2.695 41   34.89 11.27 44.25 30.82 
FCSTH 17.47 690.58 2530.5 3.266 2.692 41  34.56 11.70 44.31 31.02 
FCSPV 17.47 693.76 2530.6 3.271 2.703 41  34.10 11.72 44.16 31.49 
FCWND 17.47 693.21 2530.9 3.268 2.701 41   34.41 11.73 44.21 30.89 
FCHEF 17.47 701.76 2538.5 3.240 2.726 40.8  32.59 11.13 45.24 33.65 
FCGASH2NE 17.47 693.86 2530.3 3.271 2.703 41  34.06 11.75 44.15 31.44 
FCCOALH2NE 17.47 694.04 2531.2 3.272 2.704 41   34.12 11.71 44.29 31.12 
FCBIOH2NE 17.47 694.55 2532.2 3.272 2.706 41  33.87 11.35 44.22 30.86 
FCICH 17.47 694.04 2530.9 3.272 2.704 41  34.18 11.59 44.14 31.01 
FCIGH 17.47 694.32 2527.1 3.257 2.704 41   34.83 11.72 43.61 31.36 
FCIAH 17.47 694.14 2531.1 3.272 2.705 41  33.97 11.70 44.20 31.01 
FCIHH 17.47 694.05 2530.6 3.272 2.704 41  34.13 11.70 44.13 31.05 
FCPFC 17.47 701.65 2538.2 3.238 2.726 40.8   32.59 11.13 45.14 33.65 
FCAFC 17.47 701.9 2538.5 3.241 2.726 40.8  32.52 11.15 45.15 33.40 
FCHFC 17.47 701.85 2538.4 3.239 2.726 40.8  32.58 11.15 45.14 33.47 
FCHCACS 17.47 694.01 2531.2 3.272 2.704 41   33.84 11.29 44.23 31.00 
FCHCCCS 17.47 692.59 2531.6 3.257 2.699 40.9  33.82 11.29 44.23 31.10 
FCGCCCS 17.47 691.5 2531.2 3.237 2.693 40.8  33.94 11.88 43.68 25.78 
FCH2CAS 17.47 694.5 2531.1 3.273 2.706 41   33.88 11.39 44.24 31.06 
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Table A4. Impact on sustainability indicators of all technology policies 
Technology policy Impacts 
 Climate change indicators  Security of supply indicators 
 
Atmospheric CO2 
concentration 
Atmospheric CH4 
concentration 
Temperature 
change 
Temperature change 
(constant sulfate) Sea-level rise  
Oil R:P 
(global) 
Oil R:C 
(Europe) 
Gas R:P 
(global) 
Gas R:C 
(Europe) 
 (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100)  (2060) (2060) (2060) (2060) 
  ppm/€bn ppb/€bn K/€bn K/€bn cm/€bn   years/€bn years/€bn years/€bn years/€bn 
Baseline NA NA NA NA NA  NA NA NA NA 
Optimistic R&D -2.02E-05 -1.69E-05 7.29E-08 -5.74E-08 4.70E-07   4.32E-06 1.38E-06 -1.84E-06 -5.31E-06 
Pessimistic R&D -2.02E-06 1.65E-06 -7.05E-09 -6.58E-09 0  -5.69E-08 -2.76E-09 4.78E-07 7.26E-07 
Standardised R&D shocks                   
HYD -0.029 -0.022 -2.23E-04 -1.11E-04 0  -0.012 0.000 -0.009 -0.061 
NUC -0.003 0.004 0 -8.89E-06 0  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.015 
NNU 0.007 -0.029 0 1.43E-05 0   -0.013 0.007 -0.004 -0.045 
HCC -0.020 0 0 -5.15E-05 0  -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.018 
HCCCS -29.508 -26.825 -0.134 -0.080 0  -7.122 -2.827 -7.578 -40.712 
HCA 0.003 0 0 3.15E-05 0   0.003 0.000 0.004 0.002 
HCACS 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
OLC -0.009 0 0 -2.16E-05 0  -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.026 
GCC 0.001 -0.008 0 0 0   0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
GSC -0.007 -0.066 0 -6.61E-05 0  0.017 -0.004 -0.017 0.050 
GTR 0.002 -0.008 0 8.09E-06 0  -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.006 
GCCCS -82.622 -75.111 -0.376 -0.225 0   -19.942 -7.917 -21.219 -113.995 
WND -0.102 -0.093 -4.65E-04 -2.79E-04 0  -0.025 -0.010 -0.026 -0.141 
STH -0.474 -0.186 9.30E-04 -1.49E-03 0  -0.083 0.000 -0.001 0.303 
SPV -0.017 -0.010 0 -5.03E-05 0   0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.017 
BIP -0.011 -0.022 0 -2.24E-05 0  -0.015 0.016 -0.004 0.012 
FCMS -0.980 -0.924 4.29E-03 -2.73E-03 2.68E-02  0.158 -0.014 -0.109 -0.282 
GASH2NE -0.150 -0.215 0 -0.0004297 0   0.012 -0.026 -0.010 0.310 
H2CAS NA NA NA NA NA  NA NA NA NA 
COALH2NE 0.081 -0.269 0 2.69E-04 0  -0.168 0.005 -0.131 -0.738 
BIOH2NE -4.338 0 0 -1.14E-02 0   -0.361 -0.481 0.162 -4.075 
ICH 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
ELVT -0.284 -0.247 -1.24E-03 -7.42E-04 0  -0.054 -0.026 -0.059 -0.375 
HYBB 0.012 0.124 0 0 0   0.062 -0.031 -0.012 0.362 
Non-standard R&D shocks                   
HCCCS -0.220 -0.200 -1.00E-03 -6.00E-04 0  -0.053 -0.021 -0.056 -0.304 
HCACS 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
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Technology policy Impacts 
 Climate change indicators  Security of supply indicators 
 
Atmospheric CO2 
concentration 
Atmospheric CH4 
concentration 
Temperature 
change 
Temperature change 
(constant sulfate) Sea-level rise  
Oil R:P 
(global) 
Oil R:C 
(Europe) 
Gas R:P 
(global) 
Gas R:C 
(Europe) 
 (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100)  (2060) (2060) (2060) (2060) 
  ppm/€bn ppb/€bn K/€bn K/€bn cm/€bn   years/€bn years/€bn years/€bn years/€bn 
GCCCS -0.190 -0.500 -1.00E-03 -7.00E-04 0   -0.026 -0.025 -0.006 0.292 
H2CAS 0.010 -0.100 0 1E-04 0  0.063 -0.025 -0.027 0.301 
BIOH2NE -0.010 0.100 0 -0.0001 0  0.051 -0.025 -0.011 0.293 
COALH2NE -0.250 -0.400 -1.00E-03 -8.00E-04 0   0.081 -0.026 0.002 0.298 
FCMS -0.465 -0.361 1.89E-03 -1.29E-03 1.14E-02  0.091 0.024 -0.057 -0.125 
Standardised D&D shocks                   
HCA 1.232 0.540 4.10E-03 3.16E-03 5.00E-02  0.223 0.080 -0.040 -0.369 
GCC 1.612 0.300 -1.35E-02 4.38E-03 -4.00E-02  0.240 0.079 -0.114 -0.362 
GTR -0.032 -0.050 -1.00E-04 -1.10E-04 0   0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.031 
GFC -0.696 -0.180 2.10E-03 -2.19E-03 1.00E-02  0.084 -0.003 -0.032 0.034 
NNU 0.621 0.190 -4.60E-03 2.06E-03 -1.00E-02  0.161 0.093 -0.029 -0.387 
BIP 1.534 0.750 -1.23E-02 4.20E-03 -4.00E-02   0.245 0.089 0.028 -0.354 
STH 1.496 0.760 -1.30E-02 4.09E-03 -4.00E-02  0.208 0.080 0.012 -0.345 
SPV -0.058 -0.020 1.00E-04 -1.80E-04 0  -0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.034 
WND -0.084 -0.030 -3.00E-04 -3.70E-04 0   0.033 0.000 0.000 0.034 
HEF 0.005 -0.020 0 1E-05 0  -0.009 0.005 -0.003 -0.038 
GASH2NE -0.017 -0.020 -1.00E-04 -5.00E-05 0  -0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.035 
COALH2NE -0.003 -0.030 0 -1E-05 0   -0.005 0.006 -0.002 -0.032 
BIOH2NE -0.010 -0.040 -1.00E-04 -4.00E-05 0  0.005 0.000 0.002 0.034 
ICH -0.007 -0.010 0 -3E-05 0  0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.025 
IGH 0.020 -0.530 -9.00E-04 -2.00E-05 0   0.118 0.002 -0.095 0.030 
IAH -0.016 -0.010 0 -4E-05 0  -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.016 
IHH -0.016 -0.010 0 -4E-05 0  0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.030 
PFC -0.027 -0.030 -1.00E-04 -9.00E-05 0   0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.030 
AFC -0.027 -0.030 -1.00E-04 -9.00E-05 0  0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.030 
HFC -0.004 0.000 0 -2E-05 0  0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.031 
HCACS -0.092 -0.020 -2.00E-04 -2.60E-04 0   -0.009 -0.015 -0.002 -0.027 
HCCCS -0.275 0.010 -1.70E-03 -9.10E-04 -1.00E-02  0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.058 
GCCCS -0.303 -0.010 -9.00E-04 -1.16E-03 -1.00E-02  -0.004 0.029 -0.036 -0.463 
H2CAS -0.028 -0.040 -1.00E-04 -9.00E-05 0   0.008 -0.003 0.000 0.030 
Combined R&D FCMS and standardised D&D shocks                 
FCHCA -0.621 -0.670 5.67E-03 -2.03E-03 5.15E-02  0.136 0.031 -0.076 -0.144 
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Technology policy Impacts 
 Climate change indicators  Security of supply indicators 
 
Atmospheric CO2 
concentration 
Atmospheric CH4 
concentration 
Temperature 
change 
Temperature change 
(constant sulfate) Sea-level rise  
Oil R:P 
(global) 
Oil R:C 
(Europe) 
Gas R:P 
(global) 
Gas R:C 
(Europe) 
 (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100) (2100)  (2060) (2060) (2060) (2060) 
  ppm/€bn ppb/€bn K/€bn K/€bn cm/€bn   years/€bn years/€bn years/€bn years/€bn 
FCGCC -0.655 -0.893 1.77E-03 -2.21E-03 2.29E-02  0.122 0.029 -0.123 -0.072 
FCGTR -0.419 -0.515 1.26E-03 -1.20E-03 1.14E-02   0.091 0.034 -0.067 -0.096 
FCGFC -0.410 -0.114 2.06E-03 -1.28E-03 1.14E-02  0.044 0.000 -0.015 0.020 
FCNNU -1.048 -0.945 1.49E-03 -2.98E-03 1.72E-02  0.104 0.031 -0.079 -0.130 
FCBIP -0.591 -0.469 1.55E-03 -1.81E-03 1.14E-02   0.134 0.007 -0.052 -0.145 
FCSTH -0.650 -0.458 1.55E-03 -1.98E-03 1.14E-02  0.114 0.031 -0.049 -0.134 
FCSPV -0.468 -0.452 1.83E-03 -1.33E-03 1.14E-02  0.088 0.032 -0.058 -0.106 
FCWND -0.499 -0.435 1.66E-03 -1.47E-03 1.14E-02   0.106 0.033 -0.055 -0.141 
FCHEF -0.010 0 5.72E-05 -2.29E-05 0  0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.017 
FCGASH2NE -0.462 -0.469 1.83E-03 -1.31E-03 1.14E-02  0.086 0.034 -0.058 -0.109 
FCCOALH2NE -0.452 -0.418 1.89E-03 -1.25E-03 1.14E-02   0.089 0.032 -0.050 -0.127 
FCBIOH2NE -0.423 -0.361 1.89E-03 -1.17E-03 1.14E-02  0.075 0.011 -0.054 -0.143 
FCICH -0.452 -0.435 1.89E-03 -1.27E-03 1.14E-02  0.093 0.025 -0.059 -0.134 
FCIGH -0.436 -0.653 1.03E-03 -1.28E-03 1.14E-02   0.130 0.032 -0.089 -0.114 
FCIAH -0.446 -0.424 1.89E-03 -1.25E-03 1.14E-02  0.081 0.031 -0.055 -0.134 
FCIHH -0.451 -0.452 1.89E-03 -1.27E-03 1.14E-02  0.090 0.031 -0.059 -0.132 
FCPFC -0.016 -0.017 -5.72E-05 -4.58E-05 0   0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.017 
FCAFC -0.002 0 1.14E-04 -1.14E-05 0  -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.003 
FCHFC -0.005 -0.006 0 -1.72E-05 0  0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.007 
FCHCACS -0.453 -0.418 1.89E-03 -1.26E-03 1.14E-02   0.073 0.008 -0.054 -0.134 
FCHCCCS -0.535 -0.395 1.03E-03 -1.58E-03 5.72E-03  0.072 0.008 -0.053 -0.129 
FCGCCCS -0.597 -0.418 -1.14E-04 -1.89E-03 0  0.079 0.042 -0.085 -0.433 
FCH2CAS -0.425 -0.424 1.95E-03 -1.19E-03 1.14E-02   0.076 0.014 -0.053 -0.131 
Note: zeros (0) indicate no measurable impact. 
  
